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Religious Organizations and Free Exercise:
The Surprising Lessons of Smith
Kathleen A. Brady1
Introduction
Much has been written about the protections afforded by the Free Exercise
Clause when government regulation impacts the religious practices of individuals,
and if one looks for guidance from the Supreme Court, the rules are fairly clear.
Government action designed to thwart religious exercise is, of course,
unconstitutional.2 A more difficult issue arises when the state does not intend to
burden religious exercise but does so inadvertently. Prior to 1990, the Supreme
Court had long employed a balancing approach that afforded significant relief.
Under this approach, developed in the seminal case Sherbert v. Verner3,
individuals were entitled to exemptions from laws which substantially burdened
religious conduct unless enforcement was justified by a compelling state interest.4
In 1990, in Employment Division v. Smith,5 the Supreme Court abandoned this
balancing test for all but a few categories of cases.6 Under the Court’s new rule,
the Free Exercise Clause does not excuse individuals from compliance with
neutral, generally applicable laws that are not intended to burden religious
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exercise.7 Scholarly writing addressing the proper scope of free exercise
protections for individuals has been extensive, and even more than a decade after
Smith, individual free exercise rights remain a familiar subject in the academic
literature.8
The scholarly and judicial landscape is much different when one turns to
the free exercise rights of religious organizations. Just as in the case of
individuals, government regulation frequently impacts the activities of religious
groups. For example, common areas of litigation include the application of federal
antidiscrimination statutes to employment decisions, the imposition of mandatory
collective bargaining requirements under state and federal labor laws, the
application of state licensing, teacher certification and curriculum requirements to
church-operated schools, zoning and historic preservation regulation, and the
licensing and regulation of religiously affiliated social services programs.
However, while clashes between churches9 and regulators are recurring, one finds
fewer scholarly works addressing the free exercise rights of religious groups and
much less guidance from the Supreme Court. Indeed, the Supreme Court has,
surprisingly, never directly addressed the scope of free exercise protections when
government regulation interferes with the internal affairs of religious groups. The
7
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[hereinafter McConnell, Singling out Religion]; Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise
Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990); Ellis West, The Case
Against a Right to Religion-based Exemptions, 4 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 591
(1990). For historical analyses, see Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical
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Court has addressed claims for tax exemptions, but none of these cases has
involved government action which directly impinges on internal church
operations.10
While no case has addressed this issue directly, Supreme Court precedents
involving religious groups provide support for three very different approaches. On
the one hand, there is some support for a broad right of “church autonomy”11 that
prohibits government interference with internal church affairs regardless of
whether the activities affected are religious in nature or more mundane
administrative matters. On the other hand, Supreme Court decisions also support
an approach that mirrors Smith’s rule for individuals. When government action is
neutral and generally applicable, religious groups are not entitled to special relief
even if the regulation burdens religious practices. In between these two options, a
third approach provides limited relief where government regulation impinges on
religious practice or activity. Under this middle position, religious organizations
do not have a broad right of autonomy over all internal affairs, but they are
entitled to exemptions from laws which burden religious practice. Each of these
approaches can be found in lower court decisions, and each has its supporters in
the legal academy.
This article examines the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith for guidance
in choosing among these three options. The use of Smith as a prism through which
to analyze the free exercise rights of religious groups makes sense for several
reasons. First, no satisfactory account of religious group rights can be developed
without evaluating the ramifications of Smith. While Smith dealt with protections
for individuals, courts and scholars know that they must wrestle with the meaning
of Smith in the group context. For some courts and scholars, the meaning of
Smith for religious groups is simple: religious groups, just like religious
individuals, are not entitled to special exemptions from neutral state action. For
others, however, Smith is not relevant at all to the free exercise rights of religious
groups, and they look to other lines of Supreme Court precedent for appropriate
standards. My examination of Smith reveals that Smith is not only relevant to an
analysis of religious group rights but is also very helpful for choosing among the
three options outlined above. The opinion in Smith raises a number of issues that
clarify what is at stake in making this choice, and its lessons are surprising. When
read carefully, Smith supports a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all
10
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aspects of church affairs, the most religiously sensitive as well as the more
mundane.
I.

Three Possible Approaches

While the Supreme Court has never directly addressed the protections
afforded by the Free Exercise Clause when government regulation interferes with
church affairs, a number of the Court’s decisions provide guidance. The earliest
source of guidance is a series of cases regarding intra-church disputes over
property.12 These decisions span over a hundred years, and within them, one finds
arguments for all of the approaches to religious group rights outlined above.
Several other Supreme Court cases also bear on this issue, and they, too, have left
the choice between these approaches unresolved. In this section, I will examine
these Supreme Court decisions and the support they provide for each of these
approaches. I will then examine two lines of lower court cases that reflect these
different possibilities, and I will observe the same split among legal scholars.
A. Supreme Court Case Law
The first time that the Supreme Court addressed an intra-church dispute
over property was in Watson v. Jones, decided in 1872. The litigation in Watson v.
Jones arose when divisions over slavery and loyalty to the federal government
resulted in a schism in the Presbyterian Church in the United States after the Civil
War.13 The General Assembly, which functions as the highest judicatory in
Presbyterian polity, had supported the union and opposed slavery, and after the
war ended, the General Assembly sought to enforce these views among church
members.14 The General Assembly’s policy resulted in a split which affected the
local congregation of the Walnut Street Church.15 As the congregation’s members
divided over support for the General Assembly, both factions claimed the
church’s property.16 The Supreme Court exercised jurisdiction based on diversity
12

These cases include: Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for
the U.S. and Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696 (1976); Md. and Va. Eldership of the Churches of
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970); Presbyterian Church in the United
States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440 (1969); Kreshik
v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960); Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the
Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94 (1952); Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1 (1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872);
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
13
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See id. at 690-91.
15
See id. at 692.
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of citizenship and applied federal common law. While Watson v. Jones long
antedated the Court’s application of the First Amendment to the states, the Court
was guided by what it described as “a broad and sound view of the relations
between church and state under our system of laws.”17 According to the Court, in
America, “[t]he law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no
dogma,”18 and individuals have the right to form voluntary religious associations
for the expression, practice and dissemination of any religious doctrine that does
not violate “the laws of morality or property” or “infringe on personal rights.”19
This freedom includes the right to create church tribunals for the resolution of
contested questions,20 and when church members form a hierarchical polity,
courts must defer to the highest of these tribunals on “questions of discipline, or
of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law” when disputes arise.21 Applying
this rule, the Court held that the property of the Walnut Street Church belonged to
the faction loyal to the General Assembly.22
The Court gave several reasons for its rule. First, when individuals join
together to form churches with hierarchical forms of governance, they voluntarily
agree to submit to the decisions of church tribunals on disputed questions.23 When
courts defer to the highest judicatory of a hierarchical polity, they are deferring to
the choice made by church members. Second, deference also respects the proper
boundaries between church and state. Quoting with approval the opinion of a
South Carolina court, the Watson justices stated: “The structure of our
government has, for the preservation of civil liberty, rescued the temporal
institutions from religious interference. On the other hand, it has secured religious
liberty from the invasion of the civil authority.”24 Finally, the Court observed that
civil courts are “incompetent judges”25 of the intricacies of church teaching.26 If
courts become embroiled in questions of faith and doctrine, they will “involve
themselves in a sea of uncertainty.”27
17

Id. at 727.
Id. at 728.
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Id. at 728-29.
20
See id. at 729.
21
Id. at 727.
22
See id. at 734.
23
See id. at 729.
24
Id. at 730 (quoting Court of Appeals of Equity of South Carolina in Harmon v. Dreher, 17
S.C.Eq. (Speers Eq.) 87 (1843)). (Editor: Westlaw does not have original pagination online so I
could not find a pincite)
25
Id. at 732 (quoting Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in German Reformed Church v.
Commonwealth ex rel. Seibert, 3 Pa. 282 (1846)). (Editor: Westlaw does not have original
pagination online so I could not find a pincite)
26
See id. at 729, 732.
27
Id. at 732.
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Within the Watson opinion, one can find support for all three approaches
to government regulation of church affairs discussed above. One may argue, for
instance, that the right to form voluntary religious associations and to determine
rules for church governance requires broad protection from neutral government
regulation as well as judicial deference in religious controversies. Whenever state
laws interfere with church control over internal affairs, they infringe upon this
freedom. Indeed, as Professor Laycock has noted, government regulation is “in
some ways a greater intrusion” on the church because “regulation always imposes
external rules.”28 A system of government that gives individuals the right to form
religious associations, no matter how unorthodox, places church affairs beyond
the competence of government. A broad right of church autonomy also best
accords with the separationist views regarding church and state expressed in
Watson. When the Court affirmed that in America, “religious liberty [is secured]
from the invasion of the civil authority,”29 the justices were envisioning a sphere
of institutional autonomy beyond the power of the state.
A less expansive view of religious group rights is also consistent with the
reasoning in Watson. When Watson requires judicial deference on contested
“questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law,”30 it
may, indeed, require relief from government regulation that affects religious
beliefs and practices, but such relief need not extend to matters that lack
ecclesiastical or religious significance. If, for example, state regulation only
affects secular aspects of church operations, religious freedom is not at issue and
Watson has nothing to say. Moreover, a broad right of autonomy that extends to
all aspects of church administration regardless of whether religious matters are
implicated would be gratuitous favoritism that no other type of nonprofit or
charitable organization enjoys. Watson supports limited protection when
government regulation interferes with ecclesiastical matters or conflicts with
church doctrine, but it does not support a broader right of church autonomy.
The Watson opinion supports yet a third interpretation. Watson is a
decision about the limitations of judicial review in cases of intra-church
controversies. It is not a case about neutral government regulation, and it does not
require special protections for religious groups even when the state interferes with
religious beliefs or practice. When courts address intra-church disputes over
property, they seek a peaceful resolution of the controversy which accords with
28
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the expectations of church members, and, thus, deference to the highest church
tribunal in hierarchical polities makes sense. In this respect, the decision in
Watson was not novel, nor were its underlying principles appropriate solely for
religious organizations. Indeed, the Watson majority specifically stated at the
outset of its opinion that it would be applying general principles applicable to all
voluntary charitable associations.31
In cases involving neutral government regulation, additional state interests
are at stake. When the government regulates, it does so to achieve legitimate, and
often pressing, policy objectives. Special exemptions for religious organizations
would undermine these objectives. Moreover, neutral government regulation of
church affairs does not infringe the freedoms protected in Watson. Watson affirms
the right of individuals to join together in religious associations and to create
tribunals to settle contested questions of faith and doctrine. When the government
enacts neutral regulation rather than engages in the resolution of internal disputes,
these tribunals have no role to play. Moreover, the freedom to determine internal
church structures and governance does not imply a right to exemption from
external rules that are the result of democratic decision making and apply equally
to all similarly-situated associations.
Subsequent intra-church dispute decisions also support these multiple
interpretations. In Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox
Church in North America32, decided eighty years after Watson, the Court used
some of its broadest language describing religious group rights. The Kedroff
Court found in Watson “a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.”33 According to Kedroff, this freedom has
constitutional protection under the Free Exercise Clause.34 The Court expressly
approved of Watson’s rule of deference in cases of internal church disputes,35 and
affirmed as well a “rule of separation between church and state.”36 Drawing upon
this separationist view, the Court identified a “freedom to select … clergy”37 and
an “ecclesiastical right [to] … choice of … hierarchy.”38 In addition, the Court
31

See id. at 714.
344 U.S. 94 (1952).
33
Id. at 116.
34
See id. at 115-16.
35
See id. at 110-16, 120-21.
36
Id. at 110.
37
Id. at 116.
38
Id. at 119.
32
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spoke of protections for “church administration,”39 the “operation of …
churches,”40 and “polity.”41 Thus, the Court seemed to come close to embracing a
broad right of church autonomy over internal church administration and
governance.
The holding in Kedroff is, however, limited. The litigation in Kedroff
concerned the right to occupy a Russian Orthodox cathedral in New York.42 After
the Russian Revolution, the New York legislature had transferred control of the
property from the central governing authority of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Moscow to church authorities in America.43 The Kedroff Court held that the
transfer of power from one church authority to another violated the First
Amendment.44 Clearly, the Kedroff Court believed that intentional interference
with church government is unconstitutional. However, Kedroff did not address
neutral government regulation which inadvertently interferes with church
administration. Moreover, it is not clear from the Court’s opinion how far the
independence that it envisions should extend. Protected aspects of church affairs
include the choice of clergy and hierarchy and other “matters strictly
ecclesiastical,”45 but whether more mundane aspects of church governance
receive similar protection is left unresolved.
These ambiguities remain in more recent decisions. For example, in
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v.
Milivojevich,46 the Court held that courts must defer to church tribunals on
matters of polity and administration as well as faith and doctrine.47 However, like
Kedroff, this case involved an intra-church dispute, not neutral government
regulation, and the scope of protected matters of church government is unclear.
Milivojevich involved “quintessentially religious controversies” over church
discipline and the choice of clergy,48 as well as diocesan reorganization, an “issue
at the core of ecclesiastical affairs.”49 For matters involving less sensitive issues,
the scope of First Amendment protection remains uncertain.
39

Id. at 107, 117.
Id. at 107.
41
Id. at 117.
42
See id. at 95-97.
43
See id. at 97-99, 105-07.
44
See id. at 110, 119.
45
Id. at 119.
46
426 U.S. 696 (1976).
47
See id. at 710.
48
Id. at 720; see also id. at 717 (“Nor is there any dispute that questions of church discipline and
the composition of the church hierarchy are at the core of ecclesiastical concern ….”).
49
Id. at 722.
40
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The Court’s most recent intra-church dispute case marks a substantial shift
in the Court’s treatment of church controversies, but the same ambiguities remain.
In Jones v. Wolf, 50 decided in 1979, the Court held that courts may, but need not,
employ the rule of deference developed in Watson. Instead of automatically
deferring to the decision of the highest tribunal in hierarchical polities, courts may
use “neutral principles of law” to resolve the dispute or any other approach that
does not require consideration of religious questions.51 Under the neutralprinciples approach, courts use secular principles of trust and property law to
examine the language of deeds, church charters or constitutions, state statutes and
any other relevant documents.52 Only when the interpretation of these documents
would require courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions must courts defer to the
decisions of religious bodies.53 The advantage of this approach is that it “free[s]
civil courts completely from entanglement in questions of religious doctrine,
polity, and practice.”54
At first glance, the Court’s decision in Wolf seems to undermine the free
exercise protections established in earlier cases. In Wolf, the Court’s priority
appears to be avoiding judicial entanglement in religious questions. As long as
there is no danger that courts will become embroiled in doctrinal issues, the Court
indicates that any one of a number of approaches to intra-church disputes may be
permissible.55 The dissent in Wolf observes that the result of applying neutral
principles of law or another of these permissible approaches may well be to
overturn the decision of church hierarchies.56 According to the dissent, such an
outcome would interfere with the free exercise of religion.57 In the view of many
scholars, the lesson for church organizations facing neutral government regulation
is that such regulation will be sustained as long as its application does not require
the examination of religious questions.58 Because neutral regulations are, by
50

443 U.S. 595 (1979).
Id. at 602.
52
See id. at 600-04.
53
See id. at 604.
54
Id. at 603; see also id. at 605 (“The neutral-principles approach … obviates entirely the need for
an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property
disputes.”).
55
See id. at 602.
56
See id. at 613-14, 616 n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
57
See id. at 613-14, 616-17 & n.3 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58
See Ira C. Lupu, Free Exercise Exemption and Religious Institutions: The Case of Employment
Discrimination, 67 B.U. L. REV. 391, 406-08 (1987); Marci A. Hamilton, Church Autonomy, The
No-Harm Rule, and the Public Good, 2004 BYU. L. REV. ___________ (forthcoming); see also
Joanne C. Brant, “Our Shield Belongs to the Lord”: Religious Employers and a Constitutional
Right to Discriminate, 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 275, 294 (1994) (“Jones v. Wolf sharply
51
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definition, secular standards, such entanglement will not occur often. Churches do
not have an independent right to be free from government interference that does
not involve state bodies in religious matters.
A second look at Wolf, however, reveals other possible interpretations of
the majority’s decision. The Court in Wolf was careful to point out that the
advantages of the neutral-principles method are not limited to nonentanglement.
The use of neutral principles of law permits courts to avoid entanglement in
ecclesiastical questions while at the same time securing free exercise values.59
Through appropriate use of secular language and property concepts, religious
organizations can specify the resolution they would prefer in the event of a
dispute.60 In this way, the neutral-principles approach “can ensure that a dispute
over the ownership of church property will be resolved in accord with the desires
of the members.”61 While the dissent argues that the neutral-principles method
undermines free exercise rights, the majority insists that “[n]othing could be
further from the truth.”62 Thus, the majority’s approval of the neutral principles
method arguably reflects a continuing commitment to the free exercise rights of
religious organizations as well as entanglement concerns. Such a commitment to
free exercise is consistent with protections from neutral state regulation as well,
either in the form of a broad right of church autonomy or more limited relief in
situations where religious beliefs or practices are burdened.
Indeed, in its earlier decision in Presbyterian Church in the United States
v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church,63 the Supreme Court
indicated that avoidance of judicial entanglement in religious doctrine itself serves
free exercise values. In Hull, decided ten years before Wolf, the Court suggested
for the first time that the use of neutral principles of law may be a permissible
method for resolving church property disputes.64 Just as in Wolf, the Court
appeared to give priority to entanglement concerns.65 However, the reason that the
undermines any claim that the Free Exercise Clause confers a wide-ranging right of autonomy
upon religious organizations.”).
59
See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603-04.
60
See id. at 603.
61
Id. at 604. Whether the neutral-principles approach will always work as envisioned by the
majority in Wolf has been questioned by Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in
Conflicts over Religious Property, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1881-86 (1998).
62
Wolf, 443 U.S. at 605-06.
63
393 U.S. 440 (1969).
64
See id. at 449.
65
See id. at 445 (state has legitimate interest in resolving church property disputes but “[s]pecial
problems arise … when these disputes implicate controversies over church doctrine and
practice.”); id. at 447 (logic of Watson “leaves the civil courts no role in determining ecclesiastical
questions in the process of resolving property disputes”); id. at 449 (“First Amendment values are
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Court gave for these concerns reflects a continuing commitment to free exercise.
According to the Court, if courts become involved in resolving religious
questions, “the hazards are ever present of inhibiting the free development of
religious doctrine.”66 The Court repeated this statement in Milivojevich.67 Thus, it
is, in part, free exercise values that demand nonentanglement.
To the extent that other forms of government action, such as neutral
government regulation, also intrude upon the free development of religious
doctrine, the reasoning in Hull supports additional relief. Indeed, the reasoning in
Hull goes even further. In Hull, the Court’s concerns were not limited to actual
burdens on the free development of religious doctrine. The Court was also
concerned about the “hazard” or danger of such interference. If the danger of
interference also raises First Amendment problems, arguably only a broad right of
church autonomy would be sufficient protection. Any time that government
regulation impacts internal church affairs, there is a real danger that the
development of doctrine will be affected. Even where the regulation does not
appear to touch upon matters of religious belief or doctrine, these hazards are
present.
A handful of other Supreme Court cases that address protections for
religious organizations also lend support to the three approaches to government
regulation found within the Court’s intra-church dispute cases. For each approach,
there is a decision that seems to favor it. However, like the Court’s intra-church
disputes cases, none of these decisions squarely addresses the free exercise rights
of religious groups.
For example, in 1979, the same year that Wolf was decided, the Court
seemed to approve a broad right of church autonomy in National Labor Relations
Board v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago.68 The litigation in Catholic Bishop arose
when unions of lay teachers at several Catholic secondary schools sought to
bargain collectively with their diocesan employers under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA).69 The dioceses refused on the grounds that application of
the Act would impinge on their control over the religious mission of the schools
plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil
courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.”); id. at 449 (First Amendment
“commands courts to decide church property disputes without resolving underlying controversies
over religious doctrine.”).
66
Id. at 449.
67
See Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States and Canada v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 710 (1976).
68
440 U.S. 490 (1979).
69
See id. at 492-94.
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and, thus, violate the First Amendment.70 The Court agreed that application of the
Act would give rise to serious constitutional questions.71 The Court identified the
danger of entanglement in religious matters and also stated that “mandatory
collective bargaining, regardless of how narrowly the scope of negotiation is
defined, necessarily represents an encroachment upon the former autonomous
position of management.”72 Whether the Court meant to suggest that any
government regulation which interferes with internal church affairs raises First
Amendment problems is unclear, and the Court did not elaborate further upon this
statement. Following its statement, the Court did observe that ensuing conflicts
between clergy-administrators and the National Labor Relations Board, and
between administrators and union negotiators, would further entangle religion and
government.73 Thus, it is possible that the Court simply meant that encroachment
on church autonomy would exacerbate entanglement problems rather than raise an
independent First Amendment problem. In any event, the Court in Catholic
Bishop ultimately sidestepped resolving any constitutional questions and decided
the case on statutory grounds. According to the Court, in view of the serious
constitutional questions it identified, there must be a clear affirmative intent by
Congress to cover the teachers under the NLRA before the Court would construe
the Act to apply to them.74 Finding none, the Court declined to construe the Act to
cover them and avoided resolving the First Amendment issues.75
In Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian Schools,76 the
Supreme Court seemed to support a different approach. The litigation in Dayton
arose when Dayton Christian Schools (Dayton) refused to renew the contract of a
female teacher, Linda Hoskinson, after learning that she had become pregnant.77
The stated reason was that mothers should be at home when their children are
young.78 When Hoskinson threatened litigation based on state and federal
antidiscrimination laws, the school terminated her because she failed to follow the
“Biblical chain of command” in seeking relief.79 Hoskinson then filed a complaint
with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission alleging gender discrimination in

70

See Catholic Bishop of Chicago v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1123 (7th Cir. 1977).
See Catholic Bishop, 440 U.S. at 501-04.
72
Id. at 503 (quoting Pa. Labor Relations Bd. v. State College Area Sch. Dist., 337 A.2d 262, 267
(Pa. 1975)).
73
See id. at 503.
74
See id. at 501.
75
See id. at 507.
76
477 U.S. 619 (1986).
77
See id. at 623.
78
See id. at 623.
79
Id. at 623-24.
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violation of state law.80 The school filed an action in federal court seeking to
enjoin the administrative proceedings.81 The school argued that any investigation
of Hoskinson’s claim or imposition of sanctions would violate the First
Amendment.82 The Sixth Circuit agreed with the school and granted the
injunction.83 The Supreme Court reversed.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Dayton was based on abstention
grounds.84 According to the Court, Dayton will have an adequate opportunity to
raise any constitutional arguments in the state proceedings.85 However, the Court
also added that “however Dayton’s constitutional claim should be decided on the
merits, the Commission violates no constitutional rights by merely investigating
the circumstances of Hoskinson’s discharge … if only to ascertain whether the
ascribed religiously-based reason was in fact the reason for the discharge.”86 By
making this statement, the Court seems to suggest that the outcome of Dayton’s
constitutional claim may turn on whether Dayton’s decision to discharge
Hoskinson was, in fact, religiously motivated or whether the professed religious
reason was merely pretextual. If the school’s reason for the discharge was actually
religious, constitutional relief might be appropriate, but if the school’s decision
was not religiously motivated, the Court suggests that application of
antidiscrimination statutes would be permissible. An investigation into the
school’s motive would not be relevant if the Court believed that all regulation
impinging upon church control over internal operations were unconstitutional.
Thus, the Court seems to reject a board right of church autonomy while it leaves
open the possibility of narrower protections where government regulation
interferes with religious belief and practice. One must be careful, however, not to
read too much into the Court’s statement. The Court’s comment was brief and
remains dicta. By resting its holding on abstention grounds, the Court did not
resolve Dayton’s First Amendment claims. It is quite possible that upon full
consideration of the constitutional issues involved, the Court would embrace
broader protections than it seems to envision here.
In Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. Amos,87 the Court again left the scope of free exercise
protections for religious organizations unresolved. At issue in Amos was a
80

See id. at 623-24.
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See id. at 624-25.
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See id. at 625.
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See id. at 622.
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See id. at 628.
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Id. at 628.
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483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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provision in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 exempting religious
organizations from the Act’s prohibition against religious discrimination in
employment.88 The exemption permits religious organizations to discriminate on
the basis of religion in employment regardless of whether the employee engages
in religious functions.89 While Congress had originally exempted only the
organization’s religious activities, Congress broadened the exemption in 1972.90
This expanded exemption was challenged on Establishment Clause grounds, and
the Amos Court upheld the exemption for all nonprofit activities.91 According to
the Court, legislatures do not violate the Establishment Clause by seeking to lift
significant regulatory burdens on the ability of religious groups to define and
carry out their religious missions.92 Even where it seems that only secular
activities are involved, “it is a significant burden on a religious organization to
require it, on pain of substantial liability, to predict which of its activities a secular
court will consider religious.”93 The line between religious and secular activities
is not clear, and an organization would “understandably be concerned that a judge
would not understand its religious tenets and sense of mission.”94 The resulting
“[f]ear of liability might affect the way an organization carried out what it
understood to be its religious mission.”95
The Amos Court conceived of burdens on religious belief and practice
broadly. Indirect interference with religious activity burdens a group’s religious
mission just as direct intrusion on religious matters. The Court also observed that
the inability of judges to fully understand different religious beliefs may limit
their capacity to identify burdens on religious activity, and the Court concluded
that broad legislative exemptions are permissible under the Establishment Clause.
However, the Court did not address the scope of mandatory accommodations
under the Free Exercise Clause; indeed, the Court expressly left the scope of free
exercise protection unresolved.96 Amos tells us what government may do to
alleviate government interference with religious groups, but it does not tell us
what the government must do.
For many commentators, the Supreme Court’s decision in Smith provides
the most relevant guidance when neutral government regulation impacts the
88

See id. at 329-30. This exemption appears in section 702 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1(a).
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See Amos, 483 U.S. at 332 n.9.
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internal affairs of religious groups.97 Just as individuals are no longer entitled to
special exemptions when neutral laws burden individual religious practice,
religious groups also receive no special protections. When read in conjunction
with Jones v. Wolf, Smith permits government regulation of churches where the
regulations are neutral and generally applicable and their application would not
entangle government bodies in religious questions.
However, while this interpretation of Smith is certainly plausible, it is not
the only possible reading, and the ambiguities discussed above remain. Smith
addressed the free exercise rights of individuals. The Court held that the Free
Exercise Clause does not “relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with a
‘valid and neutral law of general applicability…’”98 Under this reading, Smith
simply did not address the scope of free exercise protections for religious groups.
Thus, while Smith may mean a lot for religious group rights, it may also mean
little or nothing at all.
B. Lower Court Decisions
These multiple interpretations of Supreme Court precedent are reflected in
lower court opinions. My discussion will focus on two related lines of cases. One
line addresses the constitutionality of applying federal antidiscrimination statutes
to the employment decisions of religious organizations. The second addresses the
constitutionality of requiring religious organizations to bargain collectively under
federal and state labor laws. I have chosen these cases for several reasons. First,
many of the important scholarly works examining government regulation of
religious groups have drawn upon decisions in these areas to develop and
illustrate their arguments.99 Focusing on the same case law facilitates engagement
with these scholars. Second, these cases reflect the full range of approaches to
government regulation discussed above. Lower courts usually choose one of the
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See Brant, supra note XX, at 276-77, 280-81; Hamilton, supra note XX, at ____ (BYU 2004).
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Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990) (emphasis added) (quoting United States
v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)).
99
See, e.g., Bruce N. Bagni, Discrimination in the Name of the Lord: A Critical Evaluation of
Discrimination by Religious Organizations, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1514 (1979); Carl H. Esbeck,
Establishment Clause Limits on Governmental Interference with Religious Organizations, 41
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 347 (1984); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Toward a Constitutional
Jurisprudence of Religious Group Rights, 1989 WIS. L. REV. 99; Laycock, supra note XX; Lupu,
supra note XX; Ira C. Lupu & Robert Tuttle, The Distinctive Place of Religious Entities in our
Constitutional Order, 47 VILL. L. REV. 37 (2002); William P. Marshall & Douglas C. Blomgren,
Regulating Religious Organizations under the Establishment Clause, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 293 (1986).
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three approaches that can be found in Supreme Court case law, and one can find
cases illustrating all of these approaches.
Lower court decisions addressing employment discrimination statutes
generally support relief where these laws impinge upon the religious beliefs or
practices of the organization. These cases usually reject a broad right of church
autonomy that would extend to all aspects of church operations, and none favor
the type of rule developed in Smith for individuals. They agree that religious
groups are entitled to special protection under the Free Exercise Clause but only
where religious matters are actually at stake.
Most lower court litigation challenging the application of employment
discrimination laws to religious organizations involves allegations of gender or
race discrimination under Title VII or age discrimination under the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).100 While Congress has exempted
religious groups from prohibitions against religious discrimination in
employment, federal statutes contain no exemptions for discrimination based on
gender, race, age or other factors unrelated to religion. Because almost all lower
courts to address the issue have found that Congress expressed an affirmative
intent to cover religious organizations within these prohibitions,101 the courts have
been unable to avoid constitutional questions on statutory grounds as the Supreme
Court did in Catholic Bishop.
100

Cases have also involved claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, see Starkman v.
Evans, 198 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 1999), sexual harassment suits under Title VII, see Bollard v. Cal.
Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d 940 (9th Cir. 1999), Equal Pay Act violations, see Dole v.
Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389 (4th Cir. 1990); EEOC v. Fremont Christian Sch., 781
F.2d 1362 (9th Cir. 1986), and violations of the reporting requirements of Title VII, see EEOC v.
Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
101
See, e.g., Geary v. Visitation of the Blessed Virgin Mary Parish Sch., 7 F.3d 324, 331 (3rd Cir.
1993); DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 172-73 (2nd Cir. 1993); Shenandoah, 899
F.2d at 1394-95; Fremont, 781 F.2d at 1365-66; Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1166-67 (4th Cir. 1985); EEOC v. Pacific Press Publ’g Ass’n, 676 F.2d
1272, 1276 (9th Cir. 1981).
The exception is the Fifth Circuit, which has held that “Congress did not intend, through
the nonspecific wording of the applicable provisions of Title VII, to regulate the employment
relationship between church and minister.” McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553, 560-61 (5th
Cir. 1972). Later Fifth Circuit decisions have found that Congress intended to cover other
employment relationships within religious groups. See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d
477, 485 (5th Cir. 1980). In Scharon v. St. Luke’s Episcopal Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360
(8th Cir. 1991), the Eighth Circuit assumed without deciding that Congress intended coverage of
religious institutions under the ADEA. Id. at 361 & n.2; cf. Weissman v. Congregation Shaare
Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1041, 1045 (8th Cir. 1994) (congressional intent to cover religious
organizations under ADEA unclear, but application of Act to temple administrator raises on
serious constitutional questions).

16

Beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s decision in McClure v. Salvation
Army,102 lower federal courts have uniformly carved out what has become known
as the “ministerial exception” to employment discrimination statutes.103 The
McClure court describes the relationship between a church and its minister as its
“lifeblood,”104 an area of “prime ecclesiastical concern,”105 and a matter “both
basic and traditional.”106 Later courts have described this relationship as “close to
the heart of church administration,”107 a “critically sensitive position,”108 a
“quintessentially religious” matter,109 a “pervasively religious relationship,”110
and a “strictly ecclesiastical matter[].”111 Employment decisions regarding clergy
are a “core matter of ecclesiastical self-governance with which the state may not
constitutionally interfere.”112 Lower courts also agree that the ministerial
exception applies even if there is no doctrinal basis for the discrimination.113 As
102

460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
For cases treating this exception, see Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320
F.3d 698 (7th Cir. 2003); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Raleigh, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir.
2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2000);
Starkman, 198 F.3d 173; Bollard, 196 F.3d 940; Combs v. Cent. Tex. Annual Conference of the
United Methodist Church, 173 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d
455 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184
(7th Cir. 1994); Scharon, 929 F.2d 360; Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United
Methodist Church, 894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d 1164; Pacific Press, 676
F.2d 1272; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d 277; Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477; McClure, 460
F.2d 553; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343 (D. Colo. 1994); Whitney v. Greater N.Y. Corp.
of Seventh-Day Adventists, 401 F. Supp. 1363 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
104
McClure, 460 F.2d at 558; see also Gellington, 203 F.3d at 1304 (same); Bollard, 196 F.3d at
946 (same); Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
105
McClure, 460 F.2d at 559; see also Minker, 894 F.2d at 1357 (same).
106
McClure, 460 F.2d at 559.
107
Whitney, 401 F. Supp. at 1368; see also Bollard, 196 F.3d at 946 (ministerial relationship is
“close to the heart of the church”); id. at 949 (“A religious organization’s decision to employ or to
terminate employment of a minister is at the heart of its religious mission.”); Pacific Press, 676
F.2d at 1278 (ministerial duties “go to the heart of the church’s function”); McClure, 460 F.2d at
560 (minister is at “the heart” of the church).
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Pacific Press, 676 F.2d at 1278; see also Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (church-minister
relationship is a “sensitive area[]”).
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Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169 (quoting Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. and Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 720 (1976)).
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DeMarco v. Holy Cross High Sch., 4 F.3d 166, 171 (2nd Cir. 1993); see also Weissman v.
Congregation Shaare Emeth, 38 F.3d 1038, 1044 (8th Cir. 1994) (same).
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Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, 203 F.3d 1299, 1304 (11th Cir. 2000).
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the Fourth Circuit stated in Rayburn v. General Conference of Seventh-Day
Adventists, in “’quintessentially religious’ matters, … the free exercise clause …
protects the act of a decision rather than a motivation behind it.”114
No court has limited the ministerial exception to ordained clergy. The
exception covers all employees with ministerial functions.115 The determination of
which employees perform ministerial functions has yielded more variation among
the courts. The proper inquiry has been described differently by different courts as
some courts view ministerial functions more broadly than others. For example, in
two early cases, the Fifth Circuit employed a narrow conception of clergy.116 The
court described ministers as intermediaries between the church and its
congregation or instructors in the “whole of religious doctrine.”117 More courts
have followed the broader definition suggested by Bruce Bagni, who has
identified ministers as those whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading
the faith, church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship.”118 According to these courts, this
inquiry is designed to “determine whether a position is important to the spiritual
and pastoral mission of the church.”119 In other cases, the test used to determine
who is a minister is much less clear.120

Church, 173 F.3d 343, 350 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 464-65
(D.C. Cir. 1996); Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist Church, 21 F.3d 184,
186 (7th Cir. 1994); Minker v. Baltimore Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 894
F.2d 1354, 1357 (D.C. Cir. 1990); Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169.
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Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169. The court continued: “In these sensitive areas, the state may no
more require a minimum basis in doctrinal reasoning than it may supervise doctrinal content.” Id.
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See Alicea-Hernandez, 320 F.3d at 703; Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at
461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168.
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See EEOC v. Mississippi College, 626 F.2d 477 (5th Cir. 1980), and EEOC v. Southwestern
Baptist Theological Seminary, 651 F.2d 277 (5th Cir. 1981).
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Mississippi College, 626 F.2d at 485; Southwestern Baptist, 651 F.2d at 283-85 (quoting and
drawing on Mississippi College).
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Bagni, supra note XX, at 1545, quoted in Raleigh, 213 F.3d at 801; Catholic Univ., 83 F.3d at
461; Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1169; Powell v. Stafford, 859 F. Supp. 1343, 1347 (D. Colo. 1994).
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who are “representatives” of the church, Bollard v. Cal. Province of the Soc’y of Jesus, 196 F.3d
940, 947 (9th Cir. 1999), but the case did not require the court to examine the functions of any lay
employees. In another recent decision, the Fifth Circuit employed a mélange of factors, including
whether employment decisions are made largely on religious criteria, whether the employee
performs ceremonies of the church, and whether the employee tends to the religious needs of the
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Initially courts based the ministerial exception on two grounds. The first
was the balancing approach that the Supreme Court applied to individual free
exercise claims prior to Smith. According to the courts, interference with the
choice of clergy heavily burdens religious practice, and this burden is not justified
by a sufficiently compelling state interest.121 Furthermore, employment decisions
regarding clergy are quintessentially religious matters of church government
protected from state interference under the Court’s intra-church dispute
decisions.122 Thus, the lower courts interpreted the Court’s intra-church dispute
cases to provide relief where neutral government regulation interferes with
important religious aspects of church affairs. After Smith, lower courts have
continued to apply the ministerial exception based on these intra-church dispute
cases.123 According to the courts, free exercise protections for individuals and
groups must be distinguished.124 Protections for individuals are now governed by
Smith and are limited. Individuals are not entitled to exemptions from neutral
generally applicable laws which burden free exercise.125 However, in its intrachurch dispute precedents, the Supreme Court has articulated a different basis for
relief where government interferes with the internal operations of churches.126
The courts emphasize the statement in Kedroff that churches have the right “to
decide for themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government
as well as those of faith and doctrine.”127
In addition to the ministerial exception, lower courts have also
acknowledged the possibility of relief where employment regulation conflicts
with specific religious doctrines or practices. Such conflicts are rarely found
because courts usually conclude that church doctrine does not support
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See Rayburn, 772 F.2d at 1168-69; Young v. Northern Ill. Conference of United Methodist
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discrimination,128 but the courts have consistently affirmed the availability of such
special protection. Initially, the court’s analysis proceeded under the pre-Smith
balancing approach.129 This same framework, indeed, the same balancing test has
been applied even after Smith.130
Stepping back from the details of these cases, what one observes among
the lower courts is limited protection for religious groups where government
regulation burdens religious belief or practice. Where government regulation
interferes with the organization’s choice of clergy, it, by definition, burdens
religion. In the words of the D.C. Circuit, the “determination of ‘whose voice
speaks for the church’ is per se a religious matter.”131 In cases involving
nonministerial employees, a conflict between religious doctrine and secular
employment standards must be established. In either case, however, courts have
only granted relief in cases where religious matters are impinged. The courts have
not recognized a broad right of church autonomy governing all aspects of church
operations. They repeatedly distinguish regulations interfering with religious
matters from those that touch only secular operations.132 It is not intrusion on
church matters alone that is unconstitutional. The impact of regulation on the
organization may be substantial but still permissible. The “relevant inquiry is not
the impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”133 As the Ninth
Circuit has explained, “while we recognize that applying any laws to religious
institutions necessarily interferes with the unfettered autonomy churches would
128
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otherwise enjoy, this sort of generalized and diffuse concern for church
autonomy, without more, does not exempt them from the operation of secular
laws.”134 Rather, the employment decision at issue must involve either a
“protected choice,” such as the choice of clergy, or a “doctrinal” justification.135
One also observes that lower courts in the employment area have also
uniformly rejected the rule in Smith as the standard for religious group rights. The
courts have limited Smith to cases involving individual free exercise rights, and
they have turned instead to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute precedent
for guidance.
By contrast, in cases addressing the application of labor statutes to
religious organizations, courts have been more willing to adopt the approach in
Smith. Lower court case law in this area has been shaped significantly by the
Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop. Recall that the Court in Catholic
Bishop construed the National Labor Relations Act to exclude lay teachers at
religiously affiliated schools. According to the Court, application of the Act in
this context would give rise to serious constitutional questions, and in the absence
of clear congressional intent to cover the teachers, the Court declined to construe
the Act to include them. Catholic Bishop was decided in 1979, and in the decade
following that decision, lower federal courts narrowed the scope of the Supreme
Court’s decision as they applied the Act to religiously-affiliated social services
organizations such as hospitals,136 nursing homes,137 homes for neglected and
troubled children,138 and day care centers.139 According to these courts, no serious
First Amendment problems arise in these contexts. Entanglement problems under
the Establishment Clause are unlikely because the programs function just like
secular charitable enterprises, and unlike schools, they do not involve the
dissemination of religious doctrine.140 While these programs may be religiously
motivated, their activities are primarily and essentially secular.141
134
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Lower federal courts also found that requiring these social services
organizations to bargain collectively under the Act would not give rise to free
exercise problems. All of these decisions pre-date Smith, and like courts in the
employment discrimination context, courts in the labor area analyzed the free
exercise rights of religious organizations under the balancing approach that the
Court had developed for individual free exercise claims. The courts concluded
that the primarily secular character of the social services organizations ensures
that mandatory collective bargaining under the Act will only minimally impact
religious practices.142 The courts also observed that none of the churches
operating these programs have religious objections to bargaining with unions.143
Moreover, any minimal burden will be outweighed by the government’s
compelling interest in protecting worker rights and securing labor peace.144 As in
the employment area, the courts repeated that “the relevant inquiry is not the
impact of the statute upon the institution, but the impact of the statute upon the
institution’s exercise of its sincerely held religious beliefs.”145
More recently, state and lower federal courts have gone even further and
upheld the application of state labor laws to lay teachers at church-operated
schools.146 According to these courts, unlike the NLRA, the state labor provisions
clearly cover teachers at religiously affiliated schools, and, thus, the constitutional
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issues avoided in Catholic Bishop must be addressed.147 These courts have
uniformly found that mandatory collective bargaining under state law would
result neither in excessive entanglement prohibited by the Establishment Clause
nor in a violation of the Free Exercise Clause.148 In Catholic High School
Association of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert,149 the only case decided
prior to Smith, the Second Circuit analyzed the free exercise claim under the
Sherbert balancing approach.150 According to the Second Circuit, collective
bargaining under New York’s statute does not conflict with religious doctrine.151
Indeed, the court observed that the Catholic Church has long supported unions
and worker rights.152 The court also found that the state’s compelling interest in
protecting the rights of employees and preserving labor peace outweighs any
minimal burden on free exercise rights.153
After Smith, courts addressing the application of state labor provisions to
religiously affiliated schools have uniformly adopted the rule in Smith. According
to the courts, labor laws are neutral laws of general applicability, and, thus,
religious organizations are not entitled to any special exemptions unless their
claims fall within one of the few categories of cases where Smith preserved the
balancing approach.154 At first glance, the decision of lower courts to follow
Smith in the labor area but not in cases involving employment discrimination may
seem puzzling. However, this difference can, perhaps, be explained by the fact the
free exercise analysis in labor cases had always been narrower. Unlike cases
involving employment discrimination laws, lower courts evaluating labor statutes
never drew upon the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases for guidance.155
147
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They relied entirely on the Court’s pre-Smith balancing approach. Even the
Supreme Court in Catholic Bishop made no reference to the Court’s intra-church
dispute decisions when it found that the application of the NLRA to churchoperated schools would give rise to serious First Amendment questions. Thus,
when Smith was decided, it is not surprising that the abandonment of the Court’s
balancing test meant the adoption of the Smith rule. In the labor area, in contrast
to the employment context, the lower courts did not have on hand alternative
precedent to support continuing protections.
In none of these cases, however, does one find a whole-hearted
commitment to the implications of Smith. For example, in New York State Labor
Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional High School,156 the New York Court
of Appeals purported to follow Smith when it rejected a Catholic high school’s
objection to coverage under New York’s labor statute,157 but the court left open
the possibility that relief might be granted in situations where the collective
bargaining process actually impinges upon religious belief or practice.158
Likewise, in Hill-Murray Federation of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High School,159
the Minnesota Supreme Court followed Smith when evaluating a Catholic high
school’s First Amendment challenge to coverage under Minnesota’s labor
statute,160 but the court then applied a balancing approach under the state’s
constitution.161 Noting the Catholic Church’s traditional support for unions,162 the
court found no violation of state free exercise rights as long as mandatory subjects
of bargaining are restricted to wages, hours and other secular terms of
employment.163 In South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization v. St.
Teresa of the Infant Jesus Church Elementary School164as well, the New Jersey
Supreme Court followed Smith but also applied a balancing approach. The
schools in that case had attempted to establish a “hybrid claim” involving the Free
Exercise Clause in conjunction with the freedom of association and the right of
parents to control the upbringing of their children.165 Where such hybrid claims
can be established, Smith preserves the balancing approach developed in Sherbert,
156
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but the New Jersey Court found no support for the schools’ associational or
parental rights claims.166 Even so, the New Jersey court applied the Sherbert
balancing test and found no free exercise violation.167 According to the court, as
long as mandatory bargaining is limited to secular terms and conditions of
employment, the state’s compelling interest in preserving labor peace and worker
rights outweighs the burden on free exercise.168
While courts in the labor area have, perhaps, been reluctant to commit
fully to the implications of Smith, lower courts in other contexts have more
readily embraced Smith. While this Article focuses on legislative regulation in the
labor and employment contexts, examples of such readiness may be found in
cases applying secular tort standards to religious entities. Increasingly, courts are
adopting the Smith rule in cases involving tort claims against churches whose
clergy have engaged in sexual abuse of children or sexual misconduct involving
adults. These courts have held that claims for negligent hiring and supervision of
clergy and breach of fiduciary duty do not violate the Free Exercise Clause
because the applicable tort principles are neutral rules of general applicability.169
The Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases are distinguished on the ground
that they prohibit entanglement with religious doctrine, not application of neutral
government rules.170 According to a recent decision by the Florida Supreme
Court, “[t]o hold otherwise and immunize the Church Defendants from suit could
risk placing religious institutions in a preferred position over secular institutions, a
concept both foreign and hostile to the First Amendment.”171
So far my discussion of labor and employment cases has included
illustrations of two of the three approaches to government regulation of religious
groups that can be found in Supreme Court precedent. Courts addressing
employment discrimination statutes have provided relief where the government
burdens religious belief and practice. In the labor context, courts after Smith have
taken a different approach and have held that religious organizations are not
166
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entitled to special exemptions from neutral regulation even if the government
interferes with religious matters. No case has yet to adopt the third approach and
establish a broad right to autonomy over all internal operations. There are,
however, several decisions approving the ministerial exception that have used
language consistent with such a right.
Indeed, when the Fifth Circuit first carved out the ministerial exception in
McClure v. Salvation Army, the court used broad language to describe the rights
of religious organizations. The court began by recalling that the First Amendment
“has built a ‘wall of separation” between church and State.”172 The court then
turned to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases, which, in the courts
words, “place matters of church government and administration beyond the
purview of civil authorities.”173 The court repeated the statement in Kedroff that
this line of cases “radiates … a spirit of freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or manipulation, in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as well as
those of faith and doctrine.”174 The Fifth Circuit expressly limited its decision to
the church-minister relationship,175 and it never stated that all matters of church
administration, no matter how secular or mundane, are protected by the First
Amendment. However, the court left open that possibility, and the language that it
did use was broad.
Subsequent Fifth Circuit cases decided shortly after McClure interpreted
McClure and the ministerial exception narrowly.176 According to these cases, only
where there is an actual burden on religious beliefs and practice is protection
warranted.177 However, broad language reappears in later cases, most prominently
in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in EEOC v. Catholic University of America178 and
the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision in Combs v. Central Texas Annual Conference
of the United Methodist Church.179 Within the Supreme Court’s intra-church
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dispute cases, the D.C. Circuit finds a “constitutional right of a church to manage
its own affairs free from government interference”180 and the “affirmation of a
church’s sovereignty over its own affairs.”181 The court “agree[d] with the Fifth
Circuit [in McClure] that ‘throughout these opinions there exists a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an independence from secular control or
manipulation …’”182 Churches have the “freedom to decide how [they] will
govern [themselves]”183 and a “constitutional right of autonomy in [their] own
domain.”184 Likewise, the Fifth Circuit in Combs spoke of the “fundamental right
of churches to be free from government interference in their internal management
and administration.”185 Secular authorities may not “insert[]” themselves into “the
internal management of a church,” which is “a realm where the Constitution
forbids [them] to tread.”186 Like the McClure court, the court in Combs recalls the
“constitutional mandate to preserve the separation of church and state.”187
Neither the D.C. Circuit in Catholic University nor the Fifth Circuit in
Combs stated that the protected realm of church affairs extends to all matters,
secular and religious alike, and their holdings were limited to affirming the right
of churches to make employment decisions regarding ministers free from
government interference. However, neither court restricted the protected area to
the choice of clergy, and the language and spirit of these opinions seems to go
much further. These cases leave open the possibility of a broad right of church
autonomy and, indeed, provide the supporting framework.
C. Scholarly Views
The same split that appears among lower court opinions is also found in
scholarly literature addressing the rights of religious organizations. The most
prominent defense of a broad right of church autonomy has been made by
Douglas Laycock.188 According to Laycock, the Supreme Court’s intra-church
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dispute cases, its decision in Catholic Bishop, and its commitment to
nonentanglement all support a strong “right of church autonomy” under the Free
Exercise Clause.189 Laycock argues that “churches have a constitutionally
protected interest in managing their own institutions free of government
interference,”190 and this right “extends to every aspect of church operations,”
including “to routine administrative matters.”191 According to Laycock,
government regulation need not burden religious beliefs or practices to violate the
First Amendment;192 any interference with “church control of church
institutions”193 is prohibited. The right of church autonomy is essentially a right
“to be left alone.”194
Of course, Laycock recognizes that a right to church autonomy cannot be
absolute.195 There must be some limits to protect nonmembers and even members
in truly compelling circumstances. While I will be defending a broad right of
church autonomy in this Article, I will not be tackling the difficult issue of where
these limitations lie. However, some general observations are helpful. First, any
limitations on the right of church autonomy must be drawn narrowly and must
identify with specificity the permissible areas of government regulation. As is
seen from the labor cases discussed above, courts applying the pre-Smith
balancing approach readily found compelling state interests to justify government
regulation. Lower federal courts upholding the application of labor statutes to
religious employers identified the government’s interest in preserving labor peace
and protecting worker rights.196 Given the small number of religious employers in
the overall economy and the fact that the National Labor Relations Board had for
decades declined jurisdiction over nonprofit institutions, religious and
nonreligious alike,197 the existence of such a compelling state interest in the
context of religious employers was doubtful.
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Thus, instead of a general compelling state interest test that leaves
outcomes uncertain, limitations on the right of church autonomy should take the
form of narrowly tailored restraints in specific areas where government regulation
is appropriate. When identifying these areas and restrictions, the strong
presumption must be in favor of freedom for religious groups. For example, one
area of appropriate regulation would be protections for outsiders. Religious
organizations can be held liable upon their valid contracts, and tort liability is also
appropriate where there are injuries to outsiders.198 Contracts with church
members and employees should also be enforceable if the language and
circumstances of the agreement would clearly lead the promisee to believe that
the contract was civilly enforceable.199 However, the contract terms must be clear
and capable of interpretation without involving the courts in religious questions.
In addition, courts should avoid adjudicating contract claims involving ministers
unless the agreement expressly provides for such secular enforcement.
Regulations designed to protect the health and safety of members and
employees would also be appropriate where serious bodily harm is threatened.200
Slightly broader protections may be permissible for children and for adults whose
impaired mental or physical condition makes them especially vulnerable to
exploitation. Thus, tort liability for inadequate supervision of church employees
would be appropriate where clergy engage in sexual abuse of minors or sexual
misconduct with vulnerable adults. However, in keeping with the strong
presumption in favor of organizational freedom, such liability should probably be
limited to cases where church officials acted recklessly rather than merely
negligently,201 and liability for negligent hiring or retention involving clergy
should be prohibited altogether. Protection of child welfare may also justify
regulation in the context of church-operated schools, but such regulations must
also be narrow and limited. States might, for instance, require schools to
198
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demonstrate that students achieve at minimum levels of proficiency on
standardized tests, but direct regulation of educational programs should be
prohibited. In addition, where religious organizations hold themselves out as
providers of professional services such as legal advice or medical care, they can
be required to meet generally applicable professional standards.
These examples are not designed to be definitive or exhaustive. My
purpose has, rather, been to illustrate several important points. First, the right of
church autonomy is strong, but it is not absolute. In some circumstances,
regulations protecting church members and nonmembers are appropriate, but
these circumstances are narrow and limited. Second, there is no simple test to
identify when regulations are permissible and when they are not. Depending on
the area of government regulation, the appropriate restrictions on the right of
church autonomy may be different. Vigorous protection of religious organizations
requires careful delineation of the rules appropriate in each context.
Whether the receipt of government aid justifies greater regulation is a
separate but very important question. Certainly, law makers and funding agencies
can require religious organizations to account for their expenditures of public
funds in order to ensure that these funds are spent for the intended purposes and
programs. Scholars debate whether the government may go further and apply
regulations designed to shape the internal practices of funded organizations in the
direction of public values.202 This question has become more pressing in recent
years. While the social services programs of many religious denominations have
long received significant amounts of government aid, until recently Supreme
Court precedent placed substantial limitations on aid to programs suffused with
religious purpose and function. In the last few years, the Supreme Court has
revised its Establishment Clause doctrine to permit greater aid to these types of
religious organizations,203 and the current administration is pushing hard for
increased funding for faith-based organizations, including organizations with
significant religious identity and activity.
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The extent to which government funding may justify greater regulation of
religious groups is beyond the scope of this Article, but the basic principles I
develop here provide the necessary foundation for addressing this issue. If, as I
argue, a broad right of church autonomy benefits not only religious groups but
also the larger community by protecting alternative visions for social and political
life, regulations designed to shape internal practices according to prevailing
public values would be short-sighted and illegitimate. Permissible regulations
would instead focus largely on ensuring accountability when public funds are
expended and protecting recipients from coercion, abuse and exploitation.
While Laycock and a few other scholars have supported a broad right of
church autonomy,204 more scholars have favored the path taken by lower courts in
the employment discrimination area. Like courts which have carved out the
ministerial exception, some of these scholars have identified certain aspects of
church administration which should receive special protection under the First
Amendment. For example, Bruce Bagni has argued that the “purely spiritual”
matters at the “core or heart” of the church should be protected from government
regulation except where the state’s interest is truly compelling.205 According to
Bagni, these matters are the “spiritual epicenter” of the church, and within this
epicenter, Bagni includes the relationship between church and minister,
membership policies, religious education, worship and ritual.206 Where activities
lie outside this epicenter, they can be regulated in proportion to their degree of
secularity.207
Carl Esbeck supports a similar distinction under the Establishment Clause.
Esbeck envisions the Establishment Clause as a “structural restraint on
governmental power”208 that bars the government from intruding on “inherently
religious”209 matters. These matters include those “exclusively religious
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activities” at the core of the organization’s religious identity,210 and include
worship, teaching, propagation of the faith, doctrine, ecclesiastical polity, church
discipline, membership rules, and personnel decisions regarding clergy and other
employees chosen on the basis of religion.211 According to Esbeck, within this
“domain,” churches have a “sphere of autonomy” that is outside the competence
and jurisdiction of the state.212 With respect to matters that are not inherently
religious, such as some aspects of social services work, the Establishment Clause
permits regulation,213 though even here “[a] special wariness should characterize
the relationship.”214
Professors Ira Lupu and Robert Tuttle also draw upon the Establishment
Clause and envision a “zone”215 of religious activity that is beyond the
competence and jurisdiction of government.216 This area of “ecclesiastical
immunity”217 consists of the “aspects of the behavior of religious institutions that
are bound up with the sacred,”218 and includes matters such as the employment of
clergy,219 worship,220 and organizational polity.221 According to Lupu and Tuttle,
when “religious institutions act in uniquely religious ways, making connections
with the world beyond the temporal and material concerns … of the state,” they
are protected from government interference.222 On the other hand, where the
functions of religious institutions resemble other nonprofits, Lupu and Tuttle
favor a rule of neutrality that treats religious and nonreligious institutions alike.223
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Each of these scholars draws a line between specially protected religious
activities and activities that do not receive special treatment. Those matters that
are quintessentially or inherently religious are accorded strong protection from
government intervention, but other practices can be regulated. Thus, religious
organizations receive some relief from state regulation, but the areas of relief are
limited. Other scholars who support limited relief favor the balancing approach
developed by the Supreme Court prior to Smith. For example, in an article written
in 1986, William Marshall and Douglas Blomgren favored free exercise
protections where government regulation interferes with religious practices or
conflicts with matters of church doctrine.224 Regulation of core religious activities
like the employment of clergy would infringe upon free exercise,225 but so would
other types of government interference with religious doctrine and practice.
Marshall and Blomgren do not draw distinctions between quintessentially
religious activities and those which are less religiously significant.
The final approach to government regulation of religious institutions also
has supporters in the academy. According to these scholars, religious
organizations are not entitled to special protections from neutral government
regulation even when religious practice is burdened. For example, Marci
Hamilton argues that the rule in Smith should be extended to cases involving
religious groups.226 In his earlier work, Ira Lupu also rejected special exemptions
for religious organizations.227 Lupu’s defense of this approach pre-dates Smith,
and he turns instead to the Supreme Court’s intra-church dispute cases for
support. In Jones v. Wolf, Lupu argues, the Court “made clear that the
constitutional evil to be avoided” is not interference with organizational free
exercise but entanglement with religious doctrine.228 While the Wolf Court did
argue that the neutral-principles method it approved is consistent with free
exercise values, religious organizations are afforded no special freedoms under
this approach.229 The ability of religious organizations to structure legal
documents and transactions to ensure desired outcomes in the event of disputes is
no different than the freedoms enjoyed by other corporate bodies.230
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Lupu also observes that special protections for religious organizations
would result in advantages that favor religious associations over secular ones.231
Many other scholars have found this type of favoritism troubling,232 and some,
like the Florida Supreme Court discussed above, have found such a “preferred
position” problematic under the Establishment Clause.233 In addition, many
observe that the trend on the Supreme Court is towards a neutralism that treats
religious and nonreligious entities equally for Free Exercise and Establishment
Clause purposes.234 Smith embraced this neutralism in the free exercise field, and
the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris235 permitting
religiously-affiliated schools to participate in voucher programs embraced
neutralism in the Establishment Clause field.236
Lupu makes an additional observation. The behavior of religious
organizations, including the group’s internal practices, affects society at large.
Religious institutions, “like other important social institutions, are influential in
shaping behavior and moral convictions.”237 Thus, what goes on inside the
institution has consequences for those outside of the organization, and exemptions
from neutral, generally applicable government policies, such as antidiscrimination
policies, may harm others.238 Church members are not the only ones who have an
interest in internal church affairs,239 and special protections often come at the
expense of the larger community.240

II.

Lessons from Smith
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As the previous section demonstrates, Supreme Court precedent, lower
court case law and scholar writing leave us with three very different approaches to
neutral government regulation that interferes with the internal affairs of religious
organizations. In this section, I will identify the approach that I believe to be the
most appropriate. As I noted in the introduction, I will be using the Smith decision
as a prism through which to analyze the rights of religious organizations under the
Free Exercise Clause. For some courts and scholars, Smith has nothing to say
about free exercise protections for religious groups. Smith addresses only the
rights of individual believers, and other precedents, such as the Court’s intrachurch dispute cases, provide the standard for religious groups. For other courts
and scholars, Smith means the same thing for religious groups as it does for
individuals. Neither receive special protection when neutral regulation interferes
with religious practice. In my view, neither interpretation is correct. The rule in
Smith for individual believers is not the same standard that should apply to
government regulation of religious groups. However, the analysis in Smith is not
irrelevant to assessing the scope of religious group rights. To the contrary, Smith
raises a number of issues that help to clarify what is at stake in choosing among
the different options. When these issues are examined closely, the results are
surprising. Smith supports a broad right of autonomy for religious groups that
extends to internal matters with clear religious significance as well as activities
that appear more mundane or secular.
A. Religious Groups and Freedom of Belief
The first guidepost that Smith provides lies in the first few sentences of its
analysis when the Court draws a distinction between protections for religious
beliefs and protections for religious action. According to Smith, the “free exercise
of religion means, first and foremost, the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires.”241 Watson v. Jones expressed a similar view. In
America, the “law knows no heresy, and is committed to the support of no dogma,
the establishment of no sect.”242 Action receives less protection. While an
individual is free to believe whatever they choose, the Free Exercise Clause does
not guarantee the right to act on these beliefs where neutral laws of general
applicability stand in the way.243 An individual’s religious beliefs do not “excuse
him from compliance with an otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the
State is free to regulate.”244
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According to the Court, greater protection for action under the balancing
approach developed in Sherbert is problematic for several reasons. First, if a
religious believer is entitled to an exemption whenever the government burdens
religious conduct and the state’s interest is not compelling, the believer will
“become a law unto himself,”245 and chaos will ensue.246 Such a rule is especially
dangerous in a nation that includes and values diverse religious beliefs.247
Furthermore, the Sherbert balancing test unfairly privileges religious liberty over
other constitutional rights.248 In other contexts such as the Equal Protection and
Speech Clauses, compelling state interest analysis produces “equality of treatment
and an unrestricted flow of contending speech”; here it would “produce a private
right to ignore generally applicable laws[,] [which] is a constitutional
anomaly.”249 In addition, limiting free exercise protection to burdens on religious
practices that are central to the believer’s faith is unworkable.250 Judges are not fit
to investigate and determine which beliefs are central in different religious
traditions.251
While the Free Exercise Clause does not require individual exemptions
from neutral laws of general applicability, Smith does envision legislative
relief.252 The Free Exercise Clause reflects a solicitude for religious liberty that
can be expected from the democratic processes as well.253 The Smith Court points
to and approves of the frequency of reasonable legislative accommodations.254
While the Court admits that minority religious practices will be at a “relative
disadvantage” in this process, this is unavoidable and preferable to the anarchy
that is threatened under the Sherbert approach.255
Thus, in the world that Smith envisions the beliefs and actions of religious
individuals are treated very differently. In the realm of ideas, Smith envisions
unrestricted freedom. The Free Exercise Clause entitles individuals to believe and
profess whatever doctrines they desire, and Smith expects that individuals will
hold a wide range of different religious views, orthodox as well as unorthodox,
popular and unpopular. Restrictions on religious practice are, by contrast,
245

Id. at 885 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 167 (1879))
See id. at 888.
247
See id. at 888.
248
See id. at 886.
249
Id. at 886.
250
See id. at 886-87.
251
See id. at 886-87.
252
See id. at 890.
253
See id. at 890.
254
See id. at 890.
255
Id. at 890.
246

36

unavoidable, but Smith hopes that legislatures will make accommodations where
reasonable. Moreover, Smith does not expect restrictions on action to affect the
complexity and diversity of opinion. Religious individuals will continue to hold
whatever religious beliefs they desire even if the beliefs are not actionable. In
many cases, religious adherents will be successful in petitioning the legislature for
relief from burdensome laws. Adherents of minority religions will be at a
disadvantage in the legislative process, but they will not be absent. Their actions
may be circumscribed, but their beliefs will be free.
The Smith Court says little about the conditions that would be necessary to
maintain the type of unrestricted freedom of belief that it envisions. The Court
does state that the government may not regulate religious beliefs as such,256 and it
also assumes that government regulation which impairs individual practice will
not undermine the individual’s choice of belief. However, the Court does not
elaborate further. Nor does Smith address the proper treatment of religious groups
under the Free Exercise Clause. Further examination of both these issues reveals
an important link between them. Religious groups play an indispensable role in
shaping and fostering the freedom of belief that Smith envisions and is committed
to.
Numerous scholars have observed the connection between religious
groups and individual religious convictions. Individuals express and exercise their
beliefs in religious communities,257 and religious organizations also play an
essential role in shaping the beliefs that individuals hold.258 As Frederick Gedicks
has written, “[g]roups are ongoing and independent entities that influence in their
own right how individuals think, express themselves, and act.”259 Thus,
“[a]lthough in some respects groups are aggregations of their individual members,
in other respects, groups are prior to and independent of their members.”260
Justice Brennan draws the same connection between individual religious belief
and group activity in his concurrence in Amos.261 According to Justice Brennan,
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“[f]or many individuals, religious activity derives meaning in large measure from
participation in a larger religious community.”262 These religious groups do not
simply express individual religious beliefs, but the “community represents an
ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic entity not reducible to a mere
aggregation of individuals.”263
Groups play yet another important role in the formation of individual
belief. Religious communities are the vehicle for the development of doctrine. It
is through religious communities that individuals jointly develop religious ideas
and beliefs. Thus, the very formulation of religious opinions takes place within
religious groups as well as the transmission and exercise of beliefs. Religious
groups do not simply shape their members, nor do fellow congregants simply
exercise preexisting convictions with like-minded believers. Rather, religious
communities are part of an ongoing conversation which both shapes individuals
and is shaped by them. In the sometimes rough and tumble of congregational and
denominational life, individuals work together to define, refine, and reform
religious ideas. Indeed, this process is not limited to single congregations or even
single denominations. It takes place in a larger environment where religious
groups and their members constantly interact with and influence one another. As
communities face new circumstances and experiences, they may look to other
groups for guidance, or they may sharply distinguish themselves, or they may do
some of both. Individuals and subgroups may split, new communions may be
formed, and old ones reformed. The lines that separate group from group are
porous, and individuals, subcommunities and ideas cross back and forth.
Nor is the development of religious ideas and doctrine an abstract affair.
Religious organizations do not simply teach or formulate doctrine in the abstract.
They also seek to live out their beliefs in their relationships with fellow
communicants. They seek to put their beliefs into action in organizational
structure, discipline, the rights and duties of members and employees, and in more
informal social expectations and standards. Indeed, it is through this process of
living beliefs in community that ideas are tested and, again, refined and reformed.
It is also through this process that beliefs are preserved. Without the ability to put
ideas into practice within the community, it would be difficult for the group to
maintain its commitments and convictions. Indeed, without the opportunity to
practice their convictions in community life, church members may not be able to
fully understand what their beliefs mean and require. Restrictions on individual
action outside the community may not undermine religious belief if these
262
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opportunities are present, but restrictions on internal group life could be
devastating.
If religious groups play an essential role in shaping individual religious
belief and, indeed, in the very formulation of religious ideas, the freedom of belief
that Smith envisions requires protections for religious organizations. If religious
communities are not able to teach, develop and live out their ideas free from state
interference, individual belief will also be suppressed. The diversity of religious
beliefs that Smith envisions presupposes a diversity of religious communities,
each of which is able to structure its own internal life according to its own unique
religious views and perspectives. Supreme Court precedent under the Speech
Clause of the First Amendment provides support for such protection. The
Supreme Court has long held that the individual’s freedom to engage in speech
activities under the First Amendment requires a “corresponding right” to associate
with others for those ends.264 The right of association is “implicit” in First
Amendment protections for freedom of speech.265 Similarly, protections for
religious groups are implicit in the Free Exercise Clause’s commitment to
freedom of religious belief and profession. Full freedom of belief is not possible
without a corresponding right of religious groups to teach, develop and practice
their doctrines and ideas.
Thus, of the three approaches to government regulation of religious groups
that can be found in existing Supreme Court precedent, the rule in Smith for
individual religious exercise is, surprisingly, the least compatible with the
decision’s underlying principles. Special protections for religious organizations
are necessary at least where government regulation interferes with religious belief
or practice. Such protections would not give rise to the same risk of chaos that the
Smith Court feared in the context of individual religious exercise. The exemption
of individuals from neutral laws of general applicability whenever a burden is
proved and a compelling state interest is absent may, indeed, be “courting
anarchy.”266 However, the same danger does not arise when religious
organizations are exempted from compliance with regulations that interfere with
internal community life. Permitting religious groups to shape community practice
according to shared norms may have a great impact upon the lives of members
and employees, but any direct effect on the larger society will usually be minimal.
Where outsiders would be harmed, limitations can be imposed as discussed
264

Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000); Bd. Of Directors of Rotary Int’l v.
Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 548 (1987); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609,
622 (1984).
265
Dale, 530 U.S. at 647; Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 622.
266
Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990).

39

above. Federal courts holding that the ministerial exception survives Smith agree.
According to the D.C. Circuit, “the ministerial exception does not present the
dangers warned of in Smith.”267 Protections for the internal affairs of religious
organizations do not “empower a member of that church, ‘by virtue of his beliefs,
‘to become a law unto himself.’’”268
Nor would special protections for religious organizations be inconsistent
with the equality that Smith prescribes for individuals. For many scholars, Smith
reflects the trend toward neutralism in the Court’s recent case law. In both the free
exercise and establishment areas, the Supreme Court is increasingly treating
religious individuals and entities like nonreligious ones.269 However, it is
important not to read too much into the Smith decision. The Court in Smith did
hold that the Free Exercise Clause does not require special exemptions for
believers when neutral government regulations burden religious practice.
However, the Court did not hold that believers and nonbelievers must always be
treated alike. To the contrary, the Court permits and, indeed, encourages
legislatures to make special accommodations when religious practice is burdened.
Smith does not reject all special or favorable treatment for religion. Indeed, it
expects and approves of such favoritism. Protections for religious groups would
be consistent, not inconsistent, with Smith.
B. Misunderstandings and Temptations
If special protections for religious groups are necessary to preserve the
freedom of belief that Smith envisions, the next step is to determine how far these
protections should extend. Does Smith call for a broad right of church autonomy
or should protections be limited to situations where religious belief or practice is
267
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actually burdened? Certainly, religious groups should be entitled to relief where
government regulation conflicts with specific doctrines or practices. The
application of secular standards where such a conflict exists would impede the
organization’s ability to preserve and develop doctrine. Indeed, in some cases, the
effect of such application would be to inject the government directly into religious
disagreements and decision making. For example, if Title VII’s prohibition
against gender discrimination in employment were applied to ministerial
decisions by religious groups, the government would be lending its support to one
side in a long-running struggle within American congregations over the proper
role of women in ministry. Those who favor female clergy would be heavily
favored over those with more conservative views. Indeed, any time that
government regulation addresses difficult social or moral issues that also divide
church members, the imposition of the secular standard will disrupt the process by
which the religious group develops its own doctrine and beliefs. Many Americans
may approve of the results in cases where religious groups hold unpopular or outdated views. However, the First Amendment protects the freedom of individuals
to hold these views, and religious groups are entitled to the protections that make
such freedom possible.
Protections for religious organizations could also be extended to areas of
activity that scholars have identified as quintessentially or inherently religious.
Placing matters such as the church-minister relationship, religious education and
worship outside of the competence of government makes sense insofar as these
aspects of church administration are closely related to the group’s religious
mission. As federal courts carving out the ministerial exception have argued,
interference with such core religious matters by definition burdens religion.
Whether courts should go further and recognize a broad right of church
autonomy over all internal affairs is a more difficult issue. If religious
organizations receive relief whenever there are identifiable burdens on religious
exercise or quintessentially religious matters are involved, would further
protection be gratuitous favoritism that unfairly advantages religious groups over
nonreligious ones? On the other hand, is a broad right of church autonomy
necessary to fully protect the ability of religious groups to preserve and transmit
their unique beliefs and ways of life?
To answer this question, one must look at another issue raised in Smith.
One of the reasons given by the Smith majority for its rule regarding individual
religious practice is the difficulty that judges would have in identifying which
beliefs are central in different religious traditions. Providing relief whenever a
believer’s religious conduct is burdened by government action would produce
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chaos, but limiting exemptions to situations involving practices central to the
individual’s faith is unworkable. Judges do not have the ability to make such
determinations: “[i]t is not “within the judicial ken to question the centrality of
particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of particular litigants’
interpretations of those creeds.”270 If this concern is explored further in the group
context, it becomes clear that limiting judicial relief to actual burdens on group
belief or practice may be preferable in theory but it is unworkable in fact. Judges
are no more fit to make the types of inquiries required under such an approach
than they are to identify which beliefs are central in different religious traditions.
The danger that judges will misunderstand an organization’s beliefs and practices
or be tempted to distort these beliefs in order to reach desired outcomes is
considerable whether the judge is trying to carve out specially sensitive areas of
church life or attempting to ascertain whether government regulation conflicts
with specific religious teachings. For both types of inquires, it is possible to point
to numerous cases where judges have inadvertently, and sometimes willfully,
misunderstood organizational belief. The result is significant impingement on
religious doctrine and practice. The only reliable way to protect the religious
beliefs and activities of religious groups is a broad right of church autonomy that
extends to all aspects of church affairs even the most routine and mundane.
The difficulty that courts have in ascertaining whether government
regulation burdens specific religious beliefs or practices is illustrated well by
cases in the labor and employment area. These cases demonstrate that judicial
efforts to identify burdens fail for several reasons. For example, two circuit court
opinions addressing instances of gender discrimination in church-operated schools
illustrate the temptation that judges experience to misread church doctrine in
order to reach desired outcomes. In EEOC v. Fremont Christian School,271 the
EEOC sought to enforce Title VII and the Equal Pay Act against a conservative
Christian school that offered health insurance to single employees and married
men but not to married women.272 Fremont Christian School (Fremont) grounded
its policy on biblical teaching that the husband is the head of the household in a
marriage and is required to provide for the family.273 The Ninth Circuit rejected
Fremont’s free exercise argument because it found that application of Title VII
and the Equal Pay Act would not have a “significant impact”274 on the school’s
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beliefs and only minimal impact on practice.275 The court pointed to a statement
made by the pastor of the church that operated Fremont. According to the pastor,
“the Church, believing as it does, in the God-given dignity and the special role of
women, could not, without sin, treat women according to unfair distinctions.”276
The court drew a connection between this statement and the facts of an earlier
case where it had applied Title VII to a religious organization which denied
endorsing gender discrimination in employment.277 The court also noted that the
school had abandoned its earlier practice of paying married men more than
married women and offered the same life and disability insurance to both men and
women.278
The court’s argument that application of the federal statutes would not
significantly burden Fremont’s religious beliefs and practice is strained if not
disingenuous. Application of these statutes would prohibit a practice with clear
religious grounding and would prevent Fremont from recognizing the different
roles of men and women in its employment policies. The court twists the words of
Fremont’s pastor when it suggests that the church’s teaching does not support pay
and benefit differentials between men and women. The pastor never stated, and,
indeed, the church denied,279 that men and women should be treated equally in all
respects. “Unfair distinctions” are prohibited, but not all distinctions. Fremont
clearly believed that different roles for men and women in marriage make
employment distinctions based on the husband’s role as head of the household
both fair and appropriate. While Fremont chose to give women equal pay and
insurance benefits, it had religious reasons for differential treatment regarding
health benefits. For Fremont, the Bible provides clear support for a policy that is
now prohibited by government regulation. The court essentially second-guessed
the school’s understanding of its own beliefs and minimized the burden of
government regulation on the school.
The Fourth Circuit in Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church280 made a
similar mistake. Like Fremont, Shenandoah involved a conservative Christian
school that gave special benefits to married men based on the biblical belief that
the husband is the head of the household.281 The school was operated by the
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Shenandoah Baptist Church. Before salaries were increased across the board,
Shenandoah paid married male teachers a salary supplement that was not
provided to married women.282 The federal department of labor, joined later by
the EEOC, sought to enforce the Equal Pay Act,283 and the Fourth Circuit held
that application of the Act would not violate the Free Exercise Clause.284 As in
Fremont, the court found that any burden on Shenandoah’s beliefs would be
minimal.285 According to the court, “[t]he pay requirements at issue do not cut to
the heart of Shenandoah beliefs.”286 Shenandoah did not claim that the Bible
mandates a pay differential between men and women, and it had voluntarily
phased out the supplement on its own.287 The court’s conclusion that application
of the federal statute would not cut to the heart of Shenandoah’s beliefs ignores
the effect of its holding. Shenandoah believes that men and women have different
roles in the marriage relationship and that these different roles authorize
differential treatment in employment settings. Application of the federal statute
would prohibit such differential treatment. While Shenandoah no longer pays men
and women differently, it believes that such differential treatment is biblically
based, and, after the court’s ruling, it no longer has the freedom to use pay
differentials. The court has, in effect, prohibited the church from living out beliefs
with clear religious grounding.
In Fremont and Shenandoah, the temptation to reach desirable results
undoubtedly contributed to judicial second-guessing of church doctrine and to
minimizing the impact of government regulation on church life. In other cases,
failure of courts to identify burdens on group practices and belief results from an
unfamiliarity with church doctrines. The complexity of church doctrine and its
development over time often makes ascertaining conflicts between government
regulation and church doctrine particularly difficult. State and lower federal court
cases upholding the application of labor statutes to church institutions illustrate
these problems.
Many of these cases have involved social services organizations or schools
operated by the Catholic Church, and courts have repeatedly found that collective
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bargaining is consistent with Church doctrine.288 Indeed, in several cases, the
courts have observed that the Catholic Church has long supported unionization
and collective bargaining. According to the Second Circuit in Catholic High
School Association of the Archdiocese of New York v. Culvert, “the Encyclicals
and other Papal Messages make clear that the Catholic Church has for nearly a
century been among the staunchest supporters of the rights of employees to
organize and engage in collective bargaining.”289 The court continued with the
additional observation that the Church’s “strong commitment to social and
economic justice and collective bargaining was recently affirmed in the …
Catholic Bishops’ Pastoral Letter” on the economy.290 However, a more thorough
analysis of the Church’s social teaching reveals that the Church’s views are far
more complicated than these courts assume. While the Church strongly supports
worker rights and collective bargaining, the Church’s vision of collective
bargaining is very different from the framework established in the NLRA and
state labor laws that resemble the federal statute.291
While secular statutes presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship
between management and labor, the Catholic Church’s goal is a cooperative
relationship based on charity, mutual respect and concern, and the common good.
In an earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective
bargaining, I have discussed differences between the NLRA and the Church’s
model in great detail and have identified several aspects of the national
framework that conflict with Church teaching.292 For example, whereas the
availability, threat and actual use of economic weapons such as strikes and
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lockouts is “part and parcel”293 of the system that the NLRA sets up, the Church
envisions a process of reasoned discussion and cooperation based upon a desire
for mutual understanding, reconciliation and achievement of the common good.294
In the Church’s view, strikes are permissible as an “extreme”295 or “ultimate”296
means for defending worker rights, but they may never be abused for the purposes
of narrow self-interest,297 and the parties must “resume negotiations and the
discussion of reconciliation” as soon as possible.298 Likewise, the National Labor
Relation Board’s interpretation of the Act to prohibit employer promises and
grants of benefits made during an election campaign in order to discourage a vote
for the union also frustrates the Church’s vision.299 Such a prohibition impedes
the genuine attempts at reconciliation that the Church encourages as well as the
threatening and misleading gestures feared by the Board.300 Moreover, provisions
in the Act designed to channel all bilateral dealings over working conditions into
collective bargaining or other arms-length relationships limit the type of
collaboration between labor and management that the Church envisions.301
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Forcing workers and employers into independent camps on opposite sides of the
bargaining table fosters distrust and division, not the unity that the Church
seeks.302 Thus, while the Church clearly supports collective bargaining and
worker rights, courts upholding the application of secular labor statutes to
Catholic institutions have not recognized the deep differences between the
Church’s vision and the legal frameworks that they have imposed.
The lessons from these cases go even further. If one examines cases where
Catholic organizations have objected to mandatory collective bargaining on First
Amendment grounds, one will not find reference to the differences I have
described. Church institutions have not argued that the Catholic vision of
collective bargaining is incompatible with secular regimes. Indeed, in a few cases,
Catholic institutions had been voluntarily bargaining with unions under secular
law for years.303 The absence of the type of argument I have sketched may, in
part, have been strategic. After the Supreme Court’s decision in Catholic Bishop,
Catholic institutions understandably chose to emphasize the types of issues that
the Court raised in that case. However, in many cases, Catholic employers were
probably not aware of the differences that I have described. Employers may
simply not have given the relationship between secular bargaining regimes and
Catholic social teaching extended examination, or they may have been unfamiliar
with secular labor statutes and, thus, unaware of potential conflicts. Indeed, in my
earlier article on religious organizations and mandatory collective bargaining, I
discuss several cases where Catholic employers unwittingly violated labor statutes
when following basic principles of Catholic social thought in interactions with
union members.304 For these employers, the conflicts between secular law and
Catholic teaching only became apparent as their relationship with union members
unfolded over time.
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Thus, courts may have difficulty determining whether government
regulations burden group beliefs or practices because the religious group itself
may be unaware of potential conflicts. Conflicts between religious doctrine and
secular law may exist, but they may not be visible at the outset to either the
church or the courts. In other cases, courts may be stymied by multiple
interpretations of church doctrine. There are, for example, Catholic scholars who
genuinely believe that collective bargaining under federal and state law is
compatible with the Church’s vision for labor relations.305 They and I disagree
about the proper interpretation of Catholic social teaching. Sometimes multiple
interpretations of church doctrine are a sign that the group’s beliefs are changing
or developing. In either case, there may be no single authoritative view but many
legitimate positions all of which represent permissible interpretations of existing
beliefs. Where multiple interpretations of church doctrine exist, any choice among
them will entangle the courts in religious questions and interfere with the free
development of doctrine. Indeed, the fact that religious doctrine is not static but
develops over time means that government regulation which imposes no burden
today may do so tomorrow, and views which are unorthodox today or even barely
articulable may be authoritative tomorrow. It will be difficult for courts to
recognize and keep up with such changes particularly where new doctrines are in
the early stages of development or adoption.
Courts may try to address these problems by deferring to the religious
organization regarding its beliefs and burdens on these beliefs. In theory, courts
which exercise such deference will not become embroiled in religious questions
and will give sufficient protection when beliefs or practices are infringed.
However, while such deference may reduce the difficulties that courts face, it will
not eliminate them. As discussed above, religious organizations may not be
aware of the ways in which government regulation will impede their doctrine and
practices. Simply deferring to the organization regarding burdens on religious
exercise will not provide sufficient protection where the organization itself does
not fully understand the relationship between government regulation and church
practice. Moreover, when burdens are later experienced after the application of
secular law, the organization may find it difficult to obtain relief from the courts
particularly if there has been prior unsuccessful litigation. The reviewing court
may be tempted to view later complaints as a mere pretext for unwillingness to
incur the monetary costs of regulation or other intrusions unrelated to religious
matters. Moreover, because religious doctrine is constantly changing, courts must
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be willing to recognize new conflicts where none existed previously. Courts may
be tempted to believe that regulation which is permissible today will be
permissible tomorrow, but this may not be true. To the extent that courts are slow
to recognize change, they may impede the free development of doctrine and chill
the behavior of members and leaders who will understandably hesitate to promote
changes that will result in prolonged and uncertain litigation.306 Unless courts are
truly prepared to defer whenever the religious organization claims that
government regulation interferes with religious belief or doctrine, there is a
significant chance that judges will become entangled in religious doctrine and
either miss, or be slow to recognize, substantial burdens.
These examples from cases involving labor and employment regulation
illustrate a basic lesson that is repeated over and over again in the Supreme
Court’s intra-church dispute decisions and yet again in Smith. Courts are not fit to
interpret religious doctrine and engage in religious questions. As the Court in
Watson v. Jones observed, where civil courts resolve religious questions, the
appeal is “from the more learned tribunal … to one which is less so.”307 Thus,
whether mandatory collective bargaining conflicts with Catholic doctrine is not a
question which the Second Circuit or any other court is competent to answer. Nor
are courts competent to measure the burden on religious doctrine when federal
antidiscrimination laws are applied to the employment policies of conservative
Christian schools. Judicial inquiry into the centrality of religious beliefs as
prohibited in Smith is just one impermissible form of entanglement in church
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doctrine. The determination of whether government regulation places a burden on
organizational belief and practice is another.
Indeed, the problem is even more basic. When judges become entangled in
doctrinal questions involving religious denominations different from their own,
they lack the concepts and experiences necessary to fully understand what is at
stake. Faith is not irrational or nonrational as some scholars have suggested, nor is
it completely impenetrable to outsiders. However, faith sheds a light which allows
the believer to see things differently and anew. Where judges do not share this
perspective, they are likely to miss matters of religious or spiritual significance,
and they will also have difficulty recognizing where their own limitations lie.
Efforts by courts and scholars to carve out special areas of protection for
quintessentially religious matters are no less problematic. As noted above, courts
addressing the application of antidiscrimination statutes to religious organizations
have developed a ministerial exception which protects the church-minister
relationship from state interference regardless of whether the organization has a
religious basis for its actions. The church-minister relationship is an area of
“prime ecclesiastical concern”308 so “close to the heart of the church”309 that the
state may not interfere even if there is no doctrinal reason for the discrimination.
Interference in the church-minister relationship, by definition, burdens religious
practice. Scholars such as Bagni and Esbeck would expand the sphere of special
protection to include other core religious matters. Bagni’s “spiritual epicenter”
includes membership policies, religious education, worship and ritual as well as
the relationship between church and minister.310 For Esbeck, “inherently
religious” matters also include ecclesiastical polity, church discipline and
personnel decisions where employees are chosen on the basis of religion.311 For
Lupu and Tuttle, the protected zone consists of those aspects of religious
organizations that are “bound up with the sacred”312 and uniquely distinctive from
the temporal and material concerns of the state.313
At first glance, this approach seems to avoid the concerns raised in Smith.
If it is possible to identify a set of activities that are inherently or quintessentially
religious, judges can protect these areas from government interference without
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having to engage in religion-specific analyses that would entangle the courts in
religious doctrine and belief.314 However, there are several difficulties with this
approach. First, the aspects of church life which are uniquely or quintessentially
religious are not obvious. Courts may readily agree that the selection of clergy
belongs within this protected zone and probably worship and ritual as well, but
there will surely be disagreement about what other matters merit special
protection. For example, while Esbeck has identified church discipline as an
inherently religious matter,315 the Ninth Circuit recently refused to extend the
same protection to disciplinary matters, even decisions regarding clergy. In
Bollard v. California Province of the Society of Jesus,316 the Ninth Circuit
addressed a sexual harassment claim by a Jesuit seminarian under Title VII.317
The seminarian alleged that he had been sexually harassed on several occasions
by his superiors, and that when he reported the harassment, the order did nothing
about it.318 The court allowed the claim and distinguished disciplinary decisions
regarding clergy from the selection of clergy.319 At least where the church does
not offer a religious reason for the harassment, the court found that “it stray[ed[
too far from the rationale of the Free Exercise Clause to extend constitutional
protection to this sort of disciplinary inaction simply because a minister is the
target as well as the agent of the harassing activity.”320 Other courts disagree. For
example, in Swanson v. Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, the Maine Supreme
Court held that “[p]astoral supervision” is an “ecclesiastical prerogative.”321 The
litigation in Swanson involved a claim against a Catholic diocese for negligent
supervision of a priest who had engaged in sexual misconduct during marital
counseling.322 The court held that the claim violated the Free Exercise Clause
because the imposition of secular tort standards on the church’s relationship with
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its ministers interferes with “denominational governance.”323 Thus, in many cases
it will not be easy to get agreement among courts about which aspects of church
life should be specially protected, and when there is controversy and uncertainty,
courts will almost certainly get drawn into examination of religious beliefs and
practice.
Another difficulty is that the aspects of church administration which are
quintessentially religious differ from group to group. There is, in fact, no single
category of church functions which are of prime importance in all traditions.
Different religious traditions lodge their core religious functions in different
places, and sensitivity to the diversity of America’s religious traditions would
involve courts in the type of religion-specific inquiry prohibited in Smith. This
problem is illustrated well by federal court decisions applying the ministerial
exception in employment discrimination cases. Courts employing this exception
envision the role of the minister in the church as of supreme religious importance.
The minister is the “lifeblood”324 of the church and at the “heart of church
administration.”325 While this special status may seem obvious to many in
mainline denominations, it does not fit well with churches that either have no
ministers at all or where the category of minister goes well beyond a select group
of church leaders. For example, in EEOC v. Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary,326 the seminary viewed its faculty and administrative staff as
ministers.327 The Fifth Circuit agreed that the seminary’s faculty should be
considered ministers,328 but refused to extend the ministerial exception to include
the staff.329 According to the court, the seminary’s administrative staff do not
perform traditional ecclesiastical functions.330 While the seminary’s designation
of its staff as ministers reflected its belief that they played a critical role in the
school’s religious mission, the court did not attach the same importance to their
jobs. The court was working with a much narrower conception of minister than
the seminary.
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Likewise, when teachers in the Christian school operated by the
Shenandoah Baptist Church identified themselves as ministers, the Fourth Circuit
rejected their characterization and distinguished them from “pastoral staff,”
employees with “sacerdotal functions” and “church governors.”331 While the
teachers in this case taught from a pervasively religious perspective,332 viewed
their jobs as a “personal ministry,”333 and were employed at an institution that
played a critical role in the church’s evangelizing mission,334 the Fourth Circuit
had a much different picture of the clergy role. Schools like Southwestern Baptist
Theological Seminary and the elementary and secondary school operated by
Shenandoah Baptist Church reflect a common belief about ministry in evangelical
Protestant communities. For evangelical Protestants, all church members who use
their gifts to serve the religious mission of the church play a ministerial role. The
roots of this doctrine go back to the Reformation’s insistence upon “the
priesthood of all believers.” Within this evangelical perspective, protecting only
ordained clergy or employees whose role is similar to those who have been
ordained misunderstands basic church polity. All members who serve the church
are its lifeblood; all play an essential role in its religious mission.
To be sure, federal courts have been careful to expand the category of
minister beyond ordained clergy to others who perform ministerial functions.
Many courts have adopted the definition suggested by Bruce Bagni and include
any employee whose “primary duties consist of teaching, spreading the faith,
church governance, supervision of a religious order, or supervision or
participation in religious ritual and worship.”335 This inquiry is designed to
“determine whether a position is important to the spiritual and pastoral mission of
the church.”336 However, Bagni’s definition is still relatively narrow and reflects a
familiar, but by no means universal view, of ministers as employees with
leadership or worship roles, or direct responsibilities for the spread of the
church’s message. The administrative staff at Southwestern Baptist Theological
Seminary would not be included even if their work is essential to the success of
the institution’s religious mission. Nor would other employees who serve
religious organizations in nonsupervisory and nonteaching roles.
331
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Such a narrow understanding of essential ecclesiastical functions is also
incompatible with Roman Catholic polity. While the Catholic Church is one of
the most hierarchical of all Christian denominations, the Church does not limit
essential religious functions to ordained clergy or those with similar leadership,
teaching or worship roles. For example, in the Church’s social mission, those who
feed and counsel the needy also proclaim the Church’s message just as much as
do preachers from the pulpit. For many scholars, the social services activities of
religious organizations are viewed as less purely or quintessentially religious than
teaching and worship. For example, Bagni places social services operations
outside the spiritual epicenter and closer to the secular world than core religious
functions.337 Esbeck has also described social services activities as a “second tier
of religious ministry” that is “more the outgrowth of truths held by religious faiths
than they are centrally dealing with the particulars of one’s perception of ultimate
truth.”338 For the Catholic Church, this is a misunderstanding of the Christian
message. When Christ reveals God’s love for humanity on the cross, he invites
others to share in his life by imitating this love.339 Serving the poor and needy is
not a second tier expression of one’s faith. It is part and parcel of the Gospel
message. Indeed, it is the Christian message in deed as well as word. When
church members serve their neighbors in need, they follow, model and witness the
love of God. Thus, within the work of the counselor, the administrator and even
the cook there is the essence of the Church’s teaching.340
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Even if the ministerial exception is appropriately limited to leadership,
worship and teaching roles, the courts have had difficulty in expanding their
vision beyond familiar clergy jobs to include all employees with primary
responsibilities for teaching the church’s message. If one examines the outcomes
of federal circuit court opinions involving the ministerial exception, one will find
that the courts have not strayed far from traditional clerical positions. Employees
identified as ministerial have included ordained clergy,341 seminary faculty,342 a
pastoral associate,343 a diocesan communications manager,344 a professor of canon
law at a Catholic university,345 and music directors and teachers.346 Excluded
from the ministerial exception have been faculty at a pervasively religious
Christian college347 and lay teachers in church-operated elementary and secondary
schools.348 Indeed, except for theology and music teachers,349 no federal court has
included lay teachers at religiously affiliated schools within the ministerial
*2. Moreover, the fact that Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to join its work and
receive its services does not undermine this religious purpose or its expression of the Catholic
faith. According to the California court, the relationship between Catholic Charities and its
employees, “most of whom do not belong to the Catholic Church,” is not an internal church
matter. Id. at *4. The court misunderstands. While Catholic Charities has invited non-Catholics to
share in its religious mission, it retains the authority to decide what this mission is and to ensure
that all relationships within the organization appropriately reflect its religious values.
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exception.350 In its landmark Establishment Clause decision in Lemon v.
Kurtzman, the Supreme Court found that lay teachers in parochial schools play a
critical role in disseminating religious beliefs and doctrine and that religion is
intertwined with secular instruction.351 The Court in Catholic Bishop repeated
these observations.352 Nevertheless, lower courts applying the ministerial
exception have largely bypassed these precedents as they have concluded that the
educational responsibilities of lay teachers are not sufficiently religious to qualify
them as ministers.
The difficulty with any judicial or scholarly line-drawing between core
religious matters and less sensitive functions goes even further. For some
denominations, there is simply no line that can be drawn between religious and
nonreligious functions. Everything that goes on within the organization is
suffused with religious significance. Where the outsider sees routine or secular
matters, the church members see important religious activity. Again, the Catholic
Church provides a good example. In state and lower federal court cases upholding
the application of labor statutes to religiously affiliated social services programs
and schools, the courts have been confident that collective bargaining
requirements will not interfere with religious practice. According to the courts,
because religiously affiliated social services organizations function just like
nonreligious charitable enterprises and are essentially secular in their operations,
any intrusion on religious matters will be minimal.353 In the context of churchoperated schools, the courts have held that interference with religious matters can
be avoided if bargaining is limited to wages, hours and other secular terms of
employment.354 However, where Catholic organizations are involved, such a
division between secular and religious activities is not possible. For the Church,
the entire inner life of the religious community must model and witness the
Gospel principles of charity, cooperation and mutual concern.355 The Church and
its institutions are to be an example and instrument of a new kind of social life
built upon the love of Christ and unifying all persons with God and one
350
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another.356 Thus, while the operations of Catholic social services organizations
may appear to be essentially secular, they are, in fact, suffused with religious
significance. Not only are the activities of service programs a response to and
imitation of God’s love demonstrated on the cross, but the very internal life and
social relations within the community are a sign and witness of this love. Catholic
communities proclaim the Gospel message through their work and their
communal life. Justice Brennan recognized the quintessentially religious character
of such social services programs in his concurrence in Amos. According to
Brennan, “[c]hurches often regard the provision of such services as a means of
fulfilling religious duty and of providing an example of the way of life a church
seeks to foster.”357 For the Catholic Church, social services activities are no more
secular than worship and preaching.
Nor will limiting collective bargaining to wages, hours and other secular
terms of employment solve the problem. In labor-management relations, like all
social relations, the Church seeks collaboration and cooperation and rejects
adversarialism. Requiring the Church to bargain under secular bargaining regimes
that presuppose and entrench an adversarial relationship between labor and
management will undermine the Church’s ability to live out its religious beliefs.
Even if bargaining is limited to secular terms of employment, the process of
bargaining under secular regimes remains incompatible with the church’s doctrine
and practice. Where all the relationships within a religious organization are
suffused with religious significance as in the Catholic context, disentangling the
secular from the religious is simply not possible.
Thus, the only effective and workable protection for the ability of religious
groups to preserve, transmit and develop their beliefs free from government
interference is a broad right of church autonomy that extends to all aspects of
church affairs. While in theory it may be preferable to grant relief only in
situations where religious doctrine or practice is actually burdened, Smith
prohibits the type of judicial inquiry that such an approach would require, and
existing case law demonstrates that judges are not able to identify such burdens
accurately. Line-drawing between quintessentially religious activities and
activities that are less critical to the religious mission is similarly problematic. It is
by no means clear where such a line should be drawn, and, moreover, there is no
single line that fits all religious organizations. For some organizations, like the
Catholic Church, no such line exists at all. Thus, the only approach to government
regulation of religious groups that is fully consistent with the lessons in Smith is a
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right of autonomy that extends to all matters of church administration, not just
those with core religious significance and not just those that are demonstrably
burdened by the state.
C. Religious Belief and Democratic Government
At this point, the reader might object to the direction of my argument.
If limiting relief to identifiable burdens on religious belief and practice is not
possible and no line can be drawn between quintessentially religious matters and
less significant practices, the lesson of Smith is to abandon special protections for
religious groups altogether. The Smith Court reached that conclusion in the
context of individual religious exercise when it found that judges were unfit to
determine when government action burdens practices central for individual
believers. Why should the outcome be different with respect to religious groups? I
have argued above that full freedom of religious belief requires at least some
special protections for groups, but perhaps that was the wrong starting point. After
all, Smith does not guarantee a diversity of religious perspectives or that religious
belief will be unaffected by government action. Smith states that government may
not regulate beliefs as such, but the decision requires nothing further. The Smith
Court may envision a world of diverse religious beliefs unimpeded by
government action, but it did nothing to ensure such an environment. Moreover,
while it might be desirable, in the abstract, to provide strong protections for
religious belief and the groups that shape and sustain belief, there are
countervailing state policies at stake when neutral laws of general applicability
are involved. At this point, the reader should recall Ira Lupu’s observation that the
internal affairs of religious groups can have substantial effects upon the larger
society, sometimes quite negative, and, thus, the state has important interests in
extending neutral regulation to religious groups.358 While the internal affairs of
religious groups may not affect the external affairs of the larger community
directly, they often do so indirectly. When religious organizations shape attitudes,
moral convictions and behavior in the larger society, as they frequently do, what
goes on within the organizations has important consequences for those outside the
group.359 A broad right of church autonomy provides little protection when these
consequences are harmful, and the religious organization prevails even in
situations where there is no burden on religious belief and practice. Why should
protections for religious belief necessarily trump countervailing state policies
except in narrow cases where the group’s behavior directly harms outsiders?
Perhaps, the readiness of lower courts to find compelling state interests when
employment and labor laws burden group belief and practice reflects an important
358
359

See Lupu, supra note XX, at 408-09.
See id. at 408-09.

58

reality that supporters of a broad right of church autonomy ignore. Church
autonomy comes at a cost, and given this cost, why is such a right desirable?
On this question as well, Smith provides important guidance. In the
framework that Smith establishes for individual religious exercise, democratic
processes play the central role in protecting religious liberty. The Free Exercise
Clause does not guarantee relief where individual practice is burdened by neutral
state action, but citizens can and, when reasonable, should extend such protection
though legislative accommodations.
The faith that Smith places in democratic government invites consideration
of the conditions that are necessary for its flourishing. If strong protections for
individual religious belief and the groups that nurture and sustain belief are
critical for successful democratic government, a broad right of church autonomy
should certainly be preferred over the alternative of no special protections at all.
Many scholars in recent years have emphasized the importance of religious
groups and other voluntary associations for sustaining a well-functioning
democratic order. Religious groups are among the “mediating structures” or
institutions of “civil society” that stand between the individual and the state and
transmit the values, skills and attitudes necessary for self-government.360 As the
source of moral values, they function as “seedbeds of civic virtue.”361 As training
grounds for the exercise of democratic skills and responsibilities, they are
“schools of democracy.”362 However, for many scholars who have emphasized the
importance of associational life in the democratic order, this critical role does not
call for strong protections against state interference. To the contrary, the state has
an important role in shaping the internal affairs of religious and other civic groups
so that they are congruent with democratic norms and shared public values.363
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These scholars fear minority groups who teach “illiberal” values that will
destabilize rather than strengthen democratic government.364 Too much diversity
in associational life is not a good thing when this diversity undermines our
common civic culture.365
For those who desire congruence between the internal affairs of civil
society institutions and shared public values, full freedom of religious belief is not
desirable nor are strong protections for religious group autonomy. These scholars
do not want to “bend over backwards” to protect minority religious groups from
state interference where these groups do not support common civic values.366 Like
Lupu, they emphasize the ways in which the internal affairs of religious groups
can have harmful effects on the larger society, and rather than broad autonomy,
they welcome regulation that shapes, molds and constitutes religious and other
groups according to shared public values. A number of legal scholars who have
written about religious group rights in the context of labor and employment laws
share this position. Pointing to the role that religious groups play in shaping
culture and transmitting values,367 these scholars have argued that employment
discrimination within religious organizations threatens a “culture of
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subordination” that harms outsiders as well as members.368 Discrimination by
religious institutions “send[s] a powerful social message”369 and “imbeds …
prejudice in American culture.”370 Labor conflicts, particularly in educational
institutions, also impart the wrong values.371 The state’s interest in enforcing labor
and employment regulation is, therefore, very strong.372 The Fifth Circuit in
EEOC v. Mississippi College373 summarized this view well when it held that the
state’s interest in eradicating discrimination justified application of Title VII to
faculty positions at a pervasively religious Christian college.374 According to the
court,
Although the number of religious educational institutions is minute
in comparison to the number of employers subject to Title VII,
their effect upon society at large is great because of the role they
play in educating society’s young. If the environment in which
such institutions seek to achieve their religious and educational
goals reflects unlawful discrimination, those discriminatory
attitudes will be perpetuated with an influential segment of society,
the detrimental effect of which cannot be estimated.375
All of these scholars misunderstand the proper relationship between
religious groups and democratic government. Democratic government is not
supported best by homogeneity of beliefs and values, even beliefs whose
correctness seems unassailable and values which seem essential for democratic
life. Shaping associational life so that the internal practices and values of religious
groups and other mediating institutions match shared public norms stifles new
ideas that could challenge prevailing perspectives in progressive directions.
Where government regulation inhibits the preservation, transmission and
development of minority beliefs within religious communities and other civic
groups, it disserves democracy, not serves it. Full freedom of belief, even
unpopular and unorthodox belief, is essential to the health of democratic society
as are the groups that make such beliefs possible. If democratic majorities were
permitted to entrench prevailing values by intruding upon the internal practices of
368
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institutions that promote alternative views, improvements in the status quo would
be difficult to make and errors would go unchallenged. Without unorthodox ideas,
society will stagnate. The dangers are especially grave when democratic
majorities are given primary responsibility for protecting individual liberties as
they are in Smith. While it may be preferable in theory to protect only positive
alternatives and new ideas that are helpful rather than harmful, humility requires
us to admit that we do not always know where today’s errors lie or where
tomorrow’s advances are hidden.
A number of other scholars have also defended the importance of religious
group freedom in a democratic society. Religious groups and other civic
associations are buffers against overweening state power.376 Religious groups
enhance individual autonomy by providing the context for personal development
and expression.377 Religious groups can also provide a realm or privacy, intimacy
and supportive social bonds.378 In addition, religious groups mark the limits of
state jurisdiction by addressing spiritual matters that lie beyond the temporal
concerns of government.379
My view goes further. Religious groups do not just check the power of the
state, provide a context for individual development and communal support, or
address extratemporal matters. Nor do they simply transmit important values and
skills essential for democratic self-government though they certainly do play all
of these roles. Rather, for many religious groups, spiritual matters have much to
say about the shape of the temporal order. Religious communities with prophetic
traditions speak to the state and its citizens about the content of laws, the
distribution of wealth and power, and the requirements of justice. Gerard Bradley
has written that “[i]t is precisely the lot of a church to live by norms unsuited to
organize a polity acting in history.”380 This is only partly true. Of course, no
political system can mirror the relationships and structures appropriate within a
church. However, for many religious traditions, including the Catholic tradition
discussed above, the norms of the church are viewed as a guide for the norms of
politics. The Catholic Church, as I observed, views its own internal life as a
376

See Esbeck, supra note XX, at 53, 67-68 (Iowa); Garnett, supra note XX, at 1853; Gedicks,
supra note XX, at 115, 158 (Wisc); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 40, 84.
377
See Gedicks, supra note XX, at 115-16, 158 (Wisc); see also Tamir, supra note XX, at 215.
378
See Eisgruber & Sager, supra note XX, at 1311-13; Galston, supra note XX, at 604; Ronald R.
Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1001, 1072-75
(1983); Tamir, supra note XX, at 215.
379
See Gerard V. Bradley, Church Autonomy in the Constitutional Order: The End of Church and
State?, 49 LA. L. REV. 1057, 1084-87 (1989); Lupu & Tuttle, supra note XX, at 40, 92, 84; Smith,
supra note XX, at 1017-18.
380
Bradley, supra note XX, at 1087.

62

model for social relationships in the larger community, including relationships
between labor and management. For the Catholic Church, the cooperative vision
of collective bargaining that it advocates is not intended solely for its own
institutions. To the contrary, it promotes this vision as the standard that should
guide political decision makers and commercial actors as well. Indeed, the
Church’s contemporary teaching on social issues began with a document designed
to address the desperate condition of the working classes and the clash between
capital and labor at the height of the industrial revolution.381 The Church believes
that only the Gospel message can provide the “genuine solution” to these and
other social problems.382 Indeed, “the new command of love” displayed on the
cross, modeled in the communal life of the church, and imitated in the Church’s
works of mercy is not only “the basic law of human perfection” but also “of the
world’s transformation.”383 The Church looks forward to a renewed social order
which reflects384 and foreshadows385 the kingdom of God.
Indeed, it is activist religious traditions such as these that have contributed
much to the development of America’s political culture over the course of its
history. Judge John Noonan has observed that religious crusades played an
indispensable role in ending slavery and in the fight for civil rights a century
later.386 Nothing guarantees that religious crusades will be for the good, writes
Judge Noonan.387 Nor have any succeeded without conflict.388 However, much
would have been lost without their contributions to the formation of American
civic culture and political values. Though the ideals of religious crusades were at
one time unpopular and unorthodox, and even abhorrent to many,389 many were,
in fact, seeds of progress.
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Thus, democratic government flourishes best when religious communities
are free to develop, teach and practice their religious beliefs and doctrines without
government interference no matter how unpopular or even repugnant their ideas
may seem. The alternative perspectives and ways of life that religious groups
communicate and model are the source of new ideas that make change and
progress possible. Diversity of religious belief and associational life are good
things in a democracy, and they would not be possible without strong protections
for religious groups. Lupu and others are correct to point out that religious groups
play an important role in shaping the larger public culture and values. It is for this
reason that these groups must be protected from state interference rather than
molded according to majoritarian values. Anything else would be short-sighted
and harmful not only to the religious community but also to the larger society.
At this point the reader might raise a further concern. I may have
demonstrated that strong protections for religious belief and the groups that
nourish these beliefs are important for democratic self-government, but my
argument applies equally well to nonreligious associations. Just like religious
groups, nonreligious organizations may advocate and model new perspectives for
social and political life. Why, then, the reader may ask, should religious groups
receive greater protection from government interference than nonreligious groups
enjoy? Indeed, as I observed above, many scholars in recent years have
questioned the fairness of special protections for religious organizations. If
religious and nonreligious groups both provide important benefits to individuals
and society, why should religious groups receive more favorable treatment?390
The proper response to this concern is not to diminish protections for
religious organizations but expand them for secular associations that play similar
roles in the lives of individuals and the larger community. Currently, the right of
association under the Speech Clause provides considerable protections for groups
that engage in expressive activities, including the transmission of values.391 The
Supreme Court has consistently stated that where a law interferes with the internal
structures or affairs of expressive associations and, as a result, significantly
impairs the ability of the group to advocate its chosen message, the First
Amendment requires relief unless application of the law is justified by a
390
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compelling state interest.392 According to the court, government interference need
not be intentional to violate the Constitution.393 In either case, protections are
necessary to “preserve[e] political and cultural diversity”394 and to prevent the
majority from “imposing its views on groups that would rather express other,
perhaps unpopular, ideas.”395 While most of the Court’s decisions have dealt with
laws affecting membership and leadership choices,396 impermissible intrusions on
internal affairs may take other forms as well. Regulation of leadership or
membership decisions is just an “example,” though a “clear[]” example, of
unconstitutional interference.397
The protection that nonreligious groups currently receive under the right
of association is considerable, but it is not as expansive as the broad right of
autonomy that I have defended for religious organizations. Indeed, the Court’s
approach to the right of association strongly resembles the more moderate option
for religious group rights that I have rejected above as unworkable. Just as
religious groups under this option receive relief from government regulation only
when the regulation burdens religious belief or practice, expressive associations
are currently entitled to exemptions from government regulation only when it
significantly affects or alters the group’s message.
In my view, a broad right of autonomy should be extended to nonreligious
associations where possible. Just as religious groups play an important role in
democratic government, so do nonreligious associations with expressive purposes.
Moreover, some of the same problems that make limiting relief to actual burdens
unworkable in the religious context also arise where the group’s beliefs are
nonreligious. Under the Court’s current approach to freedom of association,
judges must determine when government action significantly impairs or alters the
group’s message. Unfamiliarity with the message and the temptation to reach
desirable results can lead to misunderstanding and error in a secular context just
as in a religious one.
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The Court’s recent decision in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale398 illustrates
these dangers well. In Dale, the Boy Scouts sought exemption from a New Jersey
statute prohibiting discrimination based on sexual orientation in places of public
association.399 The litigation in Dale arose when the Boy Scouts revoked the adult
membership of James Dale, an openly homosexual assistant scoutmaster.400 The
Boy Scouts argued that Dale’s readmittance would interfere with its expression
because homosexual conduct is not consistent with the values it seeks to teach
young people.401 The majority gave deference to the Boy Scouts’ description of
its message and its views about what would impair this message,402 and concluded
that application of the law would violate the group’s associational rights.403 Four
justices, led by Justice Stevens, dissented and strongly disagreed with the
majority’s conclusion and its deference to the Boy Scouts’ claims.404 According to
the dissent, the majority should have engaged in an “independent analysis” of the
group’s message and the burden imposed by the New Jersey law,405 and it should
have required the Boy Scouts to demonstrate a “clear, unequivocal” position
regarding homosexuality.406 Delving into the Boy Scouts’ internal and public
statements regarding homosexuality in great detail, the dissent found no clear,
shared stance regarding homosexuality.407 To the contrary, the dissent found it
“exceptionally clear” that the Boy Scouts did not have a shared message
disapproving of homosexuality.408
The dissenting opinion in Dale is a masterful deconstruction of the Boy
Scouts’ argument. Turning the Boy Scouts’ statements against one another, the
dissent goes far in undermining the Boy Scouts’ description of its own beliefs and
in convincing the reader that the Boy Scouts does not really endorse the position
that the group has adopted consistently since 1978 and advocated publicly in
litigation and other settings.409 The dissent’s opinion is as troubling as it is
brilliant. Giving no deference to the association’s assertions regarding its own
beliefs and expression, the dissenting justices essentially turn the Boy Scouts’
398
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position on its head, and one is left wondering whether the justices’ true
motivation was reaching a desirable result. The majority stops short of making
such an accusation, but the suggestion lies just beneath the surface. Criticizing the
New Jersey Supreme Court for reaching the same conclusion as the dissent, the
Court stated that “it is not the role of the courts to reject a group’s expressed
values because they disagree with those values or find them internally
inconsistent.”410 We must not, the majority later cautions, be “guided by our
views of whether the Boy Scouts’ teachings with respect to homosexual conduct
are right or wrong; public or judicial disapproval of a tenet of an organization’s
expression does not justify the State’s effort to compel the organization to accept
members where such acceptance would derogate from the organization’s
expressive message.”411 Regardless of whether the dissent did succumb to that
temptation, the danger was clearly present, and the dissent’s claim that its
conclusions were “exceptionally clear” was certainly wrong. The disagreement
between the majority and dissent in this case demonstrates that it is not always
easy for judges to interpret the messages of expressive associations or ascertain
when government action burdens those messages. This is especially so where the
group’s beliefs are uncommon or unpopular, not fully logical or coherent, in the
process of development, or otherwise lacking the clarity and consistency that the
dissent would like to see. The deference that the majority supports would be
helpful, but opportunities for misunderstanding will remain as well as temptations
to misconstrue. When mistakes are made, the costs are high for both the group
and the larger society. When government suppresses or alters the messages of its
expressive associations, the diversity of voices in the community is diminished.
How far protections for group autonomy should extend under the right of
association is a more difficult issue. Special problems arise in the context of
nonreligious associations that are not present in the case of religious
organizations. Except in the rare case where a religious organization operates a
commercial enterprise,412 most, if not all, of the activities of religious groups are
bound up with First Amendment purposes. By contrast, the range of nonreligious
associations that engage in some sort of expressive activity is extensive and
includes many groups with significant commercial activities or other
nonexpressive functions. Chapters of the United States Jaycees and Rotary Clubs,
which were the subject of two important Supreme Court decisions under the right
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of association in the 1980s, are examples.413 Thus, if all secular associations
engaging in expressive activities were exempted from government regulation
whenever it affects internal group affairs, much of the economic life of the
community would be beyond state control, including the nonexpressive activities
of organizations with significant commercial purposes. For this reason, a broad
right of autonomy for all nonreligious organizations that engage in expressive
association may not be feasible.
How an expanded right of expressive association might be structured and
which organizations should be covered is beyond the scope of this paper. Justice
O’Connor has suggested drawing a distinction between organizations that are
primarily engaged in expressive activities and those where commercial or other
nonexpressive purposes predominate, and she would accord the former broad
protections unavailable to the latter.414 One might follow Justice O’Connor’s lead
and extend a broad right of autonomy to those associations where expressive
purposes predominate. Other organizations would still have to show a burden on
their expression to receive relief. Such an approach seems promising, and it would
target strong protections to the type of group most likely to supply new
perspectives to public discussion and debate. However, whether this approach is,
in fact, fair and workable would require further analysis. My purpose here is
simply to point us in the right direction. Our goal should, indeed, be greater
equality for religious and nonreligious associations, but this goal should be
achieved by expanding protections for nonreligious groups rather than
diminishing protections for religious groups.
To the extent that some differences remain between the treatment of
religious and nonreligious groups, these differences need not be troubling. I have
argued that the similar roles that religious and nonreligious groups play in
democratic society justify strong protections for both, but these protections need
not be exactly the same. The right of association under the Speech Clause is a
different constitutional guarantee than the Free Exercise Clause, and the structure
and details of the freedoms afforded under these two clauses will reflect that fact.
Moreover, the Court has never required identical treatment for religion
and nonreligion. For many contemporary scholars, religious belief and activity are
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no longer distinguishable from strongly-held nonreligious convictions.415
However, our constitutional regime reflects a contrary view. As many scholars
have pointed out, the very existence of constitutional provisions dedicated
exclusively to religion demonstrate that religion is distinctive in our constitutional
framework.416 The Supreme Court’s decisions also support this distinctiveness.
For example, in Smith, the Court permitted and, indeed, encouraged special
legislative accommodations where government action burdens individual
religious exercise. In Amos, the Court held that similar legislative
accommodations for religious groups do not violate the Establishment Clause
even if nonreligious groups do not receive the same benefits. According to the
Court, “it has never indicated that statutes that give special consideration to
religious groups are per se invalid.”417 Rather, “[w]here, as here, government acts
with the proper purpose of lifting a regulation that burdens the exercise of
religion, we see no reason to require that the exemption comes packaged with
benefits to secular entities.”418 While the Court’s decisions in recent years may be
more “neutralist” than in the past, they do not embrace a thorough-going
neutralism that treats religion and nonreligion exactly alike.
So far, I have offered a justification for protecting religious groups that
should appeal to believers and nonbelievers alike. Religious groups and the ideas
they generate are an important source of new perspectives for social and political
life, and the same role played by nonreligious groups justifies strong protections
for them as well. For many scholars, a defense of free exercise protections that is
based, instead, on the special value of religious convictions or the special
authority of religious commands in the lives of believers would be unconvincing
415
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to nonbelievers.419 Whereas in the founding era, supporters of religious liberty
may have defended protections on the ground that religion is, in Madison’s words,
a “duty towards the Creator” and “precedent, both in order of time and in degree
of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society,”420 this type of argument is not
persuasive today. As Lupu and Tuttle have written, “Madison’s confident
assertion of the supremacy of religious duties over secular ones no longer seems
self-evident.”421
Before I close, I hope the reader will indulge me in such an argument. If
the reader will permit, I will show that a view that takes seriously the ultimate
importance of religious belief supports the same conclusions as the more
ecumenical approach taken above. For those in the founding era and many
believers today, the Free Exercise Clause reflects a faith in a transcendent reality
which grounds, guides and communicates with the temporal world. It is this
transcendent point of reference that is the source of truths for individual conduct,
social relationships and political life, and these truths are, in turn, the basis for
legal and political legitimacy. However, the Free Exercise Clause also reflects the
fact that our understanding of this divinity is limited. We see but in a “mirror
dimly.”422 Despite the many truths manifest in creation and even with the added
light of revelation, the God we seek is yet partly hidden, and out of this mystery
different traditions develop. These traditions all bear insights, though partial and
incomplete, of a greater reality that remains always beyond our ken even as it
continually beckons us to draw nearer. Without freedom to grow and develop
unimpeded by the state, much of value within these faiths would be lost and our
understanding would be diminished. Valuable insights are not limited to believers.
God’s grace extends to those who do not know Him by name. The Christian
tradition teaches that the world is fallen and correct understanding requires the
assistance of revelation, but God has not abandoned His creation and good
remains. Indeed, much can be known through human reason and experience, even
unaided by faith, and believers can learn much from those outside their faith. True
progress requires humility by all. Believers and nonbelievers need one another,
and only together can they draw closer to the reality that orders, sustains, redeems
and perfects the world and those within it. Thus, unless broad freedoms are
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extended to nonreligious groups as well as religious ones, the entire community
will suffer, believers and nonbelievers alike.
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